UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (WESTERN DIVISION - LOS ANGELES) JEFFREY POWERS, ET AL,) CASE NO: 2:22-cv-08357-DOC-JEMx) Plaintiffs, CIVIL)) Los Angeles, California vs. Tuesday, July 9, 2024 DENIS RICHARD MCDONOUGH, ET AL, (10:41 a.m. to 3:15 p.m.) Defendants. **HEARING RE:** PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT.NO.192]; MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT.NO.193] BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SEE PAGE 2 APPEARANCES: Court Reporter: Recorded; CourtSmart Transcribed by: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc. P.O. Box 8365 Corpus Christi, TX 78468 361 949-2988 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

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1 MR. ROSENBERG: Brad Rosenberg from the Department of 2 Justice for the federal defendants. 3 THE COURT: Good seeing you. MR. GUADIANA: And Ernest Guadiana on behalf of 4 5 intervenor Bridgeland Resources. 6 THE COURT: Okay. I want to start with something not 7 related to your motion today and that is, earlier in the case I 8 disclosed to you that first of all I was a veteran. disclosed to you that I'd had numerous contact with Steven 10 Braverman and other individuals and I got the witness list for 11 the first time last evening, about 4:30 I think you filed it. 12 We saw it last night, later in the evening. 13 And one of the motions now involves Dr. Sharon 14 Braverman apparently as a witness and a whole host of people, 15 so I'm going to tell you a shaggy dog story for just a moment 16 and it's going to take some time because there may be some VA 17 officials who come into my court whose name I haven't put with 18 a face. And I may have met them in Washington, D.C., so I 19 haven't disclosed this before. 20 It's going to take a while. What year did we start, 21 when was this, yeah, I have to go back to 2018 with Carol Sobel 22 appearing in court with Brooke Weitzman and the County of 23 Orange involving the Santa Ana riverbed and what was estimated 24 to be a minimum of 500 and as many as 14 homeless persons 25 living in the riverbed.

No citation had been issued for five and a half years by the Orange County Sheriff's Office or Orange Police

Department or the Anaheim Police Department. For want of a better word, it had become a depository, let's say with help from different agencies, dropping homeless off throughout Orange County.

That ranged from a number of cities, they had their own police force and their own mayor, coastal cities and would transport homeless from their cities to the Santa Ana riverbed and literally drop them off. And the police weren't going to be witnesses, frankly, but the fire department was willing to be.

And so if you talk to the Anaheim Fire Department, and they sat up in a tower, they would see a certain city with a patrol car dump a homeless, and sometimes veteran who was an amputee off in the river, from another city.

This is going to take a while because it's going to tie into a disclosure about VA witnesses for a moment and you're going to have to help me with who's testifying.

The first issue was trash. And after listening to three days of the parties trying to define what trash was, and frankly in frustration, I got off the bench and decided to take a walk on the Santa Ana riverbed, because the advocates believed that almost everything that the county was taking was personal property or licenses.

And for the County's perspective, this had turned into an absolute horrific health issue. In fact, 400 pounds of feces were removed in just a number of days, and so you've got a waterway. You can imagine what has occurred over five and a half years.

It was hard to define. You couldn't define trash, but walking down that riverbed it became obvious what was trash and what wasn't. And frankly a good portion of the homeless community decided, because the judge was coming, and it was kind of unorthodox and new, that they were going to clean up the riverbed themselves, and so you saw people out there voluntarily asking for, can we get trash bags because they couldn't get trash bags to clean up the riverbed.

After that eight mile or so walk and one of the advocates, unfortunately, passed out from heat stroke, but we revived her, they settled. Trust me, the walk wasn't designed to make them settle, but they settled.

And we were able to get trash bags out there, get garbage trucks coming out for the first time and open up a restroom, the only one along the river, because Orange County had taken a position at that time that we can rid of the homeless if we don't provide any restrooms.

That riverbed had become a focal point, not analogous but similar to your skid row here in Los Angeles. In Orange County it had a lot of focus, let's say, by the citizens in

So it was kind of a collective unorthodox way of

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Now, think of

for -- I'm sorry, 400 motel rooms for 30 days.

how primitive that was compared to the sophistication and the money spent now, but this is in 2018. And this is Orange County.

The second thing that we decided was we had very few mental health workers. In other words, if we're going to deal with a population that has a high degree of mental illness, is this going to be the traditional law enforcement sweeps that have taken place in Orange County before in 1998 I believe and 1999, which was basically a round up where homeless were put at the Santa Ana stadium and actually were given ink markings.

So we had to literally hire young people out of college and we called them blue coats and those people became the first, I'm going to say mental health workers on a volume basis, because there were so few professionals that you could put on the river.

The second decision made was we wanted to include the press. It occurred to me if the press walked with us, we would have less violence because normally what happens is the press, you'll see often times is put across the river or in a holding pen to report. And therefore, they've got to be suspicious when there are numerous claims made for 1983 violations, what are the police doing out there, are they hammering people or what.

So the press could walk down and report just as they went and then Brooke Weitzman and Carol Sobel stepped forward

with I think a miracle and they said, Judge, let us go down and talk to our people first. Let us go into the tents and talk to our people first before law enforcement comes in and have the mental health workers.

So talking to Don Barnes the plan became let's get Carol Sobel out with Brooke Weitzman walking down that river with the Court, so that they have authority, let's get the mental health workers right behind us and the medical people and then let's get the police.

20 yards back, so that they're there for safety purposes, but not the first tip of the spear if you would, because that's always going to cause violence and get the press right in the middle of us, because manipulatively it had a way of quelling it and it had a way of bringing down law enforcement because they're trained to be paramilitary. We're asking them to do so much.

The next thing that occurred to me was that the federal court, by the time we heard a problem in our traditional way of sitting on the bench, if you're out in the riverbed as litigants and something occurs, we've got 18 dump trucks, we've got 40 blue coats, we've got 25 to 30 sheriffs, if you see a problem, you now have to come to court, you have to get your coat and tie if you start it at 9 o'clock, by the time you drive to court and get dressed up so you look like you're supposed to be in court, 10 o'clock, by the time you try

1 to explain it to the judge who's trying to absorb it, 11 or 2 11:30, by the time I try to write an opinion 2 o'clock or 2:30, by the time we take that back out there, we've held up 18 3 trucks, we've literally stopped that effort, so an unorthodox 4

5 position admittedly, we simply took the federal court to the 6

riverbed.

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And the reason was, setting up a card table, if we saw something, we could immediately resolve it on the spot. Now, thank God we did that because the first day -- oh, I'm sorry, the second day, the first day was wonderful; the second day the union said to the county workers, you can't start work until 8:30. Well everybody was ready to go at 8 o'clock so the sheriffs were about to step off first, which would've caused a melee on the river and by simply saying, I'm going to threaten you with an injunction, stop that process, by 9 o'clock we had it sorted out.

The unions came on board, extended the hours, et cetera, my compliments to them, no violence. I represent to you that in five days with what turned out not to be 500 people, it turned out to be almost 1,400 people we didn't have one act of violence. Let me repeat that.

Now, it's going to lead to Ben Carson in a moment so hang with me, stay with me for a moment. The biggest problem at that time turned out to be the VA which is not connected to And what occurred was that the VA, we called and your case.

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said to the VA, hey, look, we've got veterans out there, one
quy in fact is an amputee who's been dropped off by a certain
city, according to Anaheim in the middle of the night, he's
trying to go the bathroom in a plastic bottle, can you help us.
Well, Judge, you don't have jurisdiction.
          Well, it's a navigable waterway, have you looked at
the -- now that should cause a laugh. If you looked at the
Santa Ana River, I don't know if it's a navigable waterway, but
it's kind of a tough place when you're in federal court and
you've got, you know, an audience like this with a hundred
people in your court literally and you literally ask one of the
attorneys to call the VA in court, that's got to be
embarrassing.
          The VA came out. And by the way, they did a
wonderful job. They literally responded to that phone call,
but that frankly took some grandstanding and some pressure to
get them out there. But when they got there, they were
phenomenal. We got our veterans sorted out, we got
identification, we got the DD-214s, we got licenses, we start
them in the process.
          So that's my first disclosure about my initial
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So that's my first disclosure about my initial meeting with the VA. Pressured to get them there, the press was helpful in that. Benefit, once they got there, phenomenal job.

All right. Now, there's a Voice of Orange County and

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    they're writing articles at this time and Spencer Custodio, I'm
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    mispronouncing his name, but it wasn't making an impact other
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    than Orange County and then the Los Angeles Times picked it up.
    Bednarowski at the time and who's the other person, yeah,
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    Christopher Goffard. And they wrote about this clearance going
    on on the Santa Ana riverbed. And when the LA Times picked
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    that up, I then got a call from Ben Carson who was part of the
    Trump administration and I believe he's HUD, help me, yeah.
              And he asked -- he was going to come out and talk
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    about what he saw as this phenomenal effort in Orange County
    and my response is, if you come here, every member of the press
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    will pick that up. I'll just fly to Washington, D.C.
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    easier for a federal judge, nobody knows who I am, nobody cares
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    in Washington, D.C., but, Ben Carson, if you're coming here,
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    that's going to attract a lot of notoriety and if we're going
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    to have a conversation, let's have it in D.C.
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              Now, what was happening out in the riverbed, remember
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    I said -- no, we had 1,400 people out there.
                                                   When we signed
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    the injunction, we gave them two weeks. And the last portion
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    of that two weeks, we estimate about 400 people simply left
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    because this clearance was starting let's say hypothetically on
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    a Monday, I forget the day of the week, 400 people just
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    disappeared.
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              We don't know if they went into a residential area,
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    we don't know if they went back home, we don't know if they
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were couch surfing, we have no idea where they went. We had about, I think Carolyn Brooks and I would estimate about a thousand people on that river. And when we started down that river the first day you have to imagine all these dump trucks

lined up, this huge contingency going down the river.

At the end of five days, we had 810 people who literally stood there waiting for shelter. Now, going down the river at that time, Edward Do was the chairman at that time of the Board of Supervisors and he looked at Frank Kim on the second day and said, we've got motel rooms for 400 people for 30 days, we've got 800 people out here and he made the individual decision on that river without going to the Board, Frank, get me 400 more motel rooms.

Now, eventually he went back to the Board and got permission, but he made that decision unilaterally on the river.

Okay. You've heard about 60 percent and you've heard about 60 percent plus 1. Where does that come from as I get back to Ben Carson in a moment.

When we resolved the Orange County case, Carol took the position, that's Carol Sobel, Judge, we had a thousand people on the river, remember, we had 810 who wanted shelter, remember. So, Judge, we will settle for 81 percent. In other words, we will settle with different cities at 81 percent. Not a hundred percent, because my position was, you can't ask for a

hundred percent because your cities and counties can't afford it. Because you don't have a hundred percent of your homeless who are going to shelter. Some are from out of state, some are going to be in trouble with the law, some are mental health issues who belong to the county that your city shouldn't be paying for.

We don't know the percentage, but the county's position was 60 percent. Now, you take 1,400 and take 810 somebody do the math for me, it's about 60 percent give or take.

So our position was, and Carol was fearless by the way, she walked out of my chambers. She was angry. She said, Judge, you're settling for 60 percent with the county. I said, Carol, here's the bottom line, if it's 60 percent that I'm offering to the cities as a settlement, it will also be plus 1.

So if you understand this, you're geniuses. That means if we ever get to 60 percent of an encampment and we have a number of homeless left over, we have to stop. You have to then go find those additional spaces, shelter or housing for those homeless persons, it's just not a flat 60 percent.

So do you understand that so far? That's complicated stuff, let me repeat it very quickly. Look, a hundred percent of your homeless population is not going into shelter. You cannot ask your city or your county to build out at a hundred percent. It's a waste of their money.

And, in fact, if you build out shelter at a hundred percent, you should be devoting some of that money to long term supportive housing. Because a lot of these people are from out of state, a certain small percentage, some are couch surfing by the way, some are out there just having a party and can go a lot of different places.

So this is a random number, 60 percent. And that's because the 810 equated to 1,400. So in taking the county's number, Carol's position was, Judge, there's a thousand people there, 810 are left, that's 81 percent. The county's position is no, it's 60 percent, because you didn't start with a thousand people, you started with 1,400 people and 400 of them they went away.

I took the county's lowest number. Now Carolyn Brook with along with that to give it a test run. But remember, it wasn't 60 percent, it was 60 percent plus one. North County came on board, regionally 11 cities, Anaheim came on board, Santa Ana came on board, which were your 800 pound guerillas, that's where most of the homeless where.

The central and the northern part all came on board on settlements, guess what, the south county didn't. Okay.

When the LA Times picked it up, it's my speculation that that is a national paper sold -- that this story about Orange County get nationwide. I get a call then from Ben Carson, okay, from his -- I'm sorry, from his chief of staff.

And flying to D.C. I thought that that was going to be a one-on-one meeting with him about why Orange County was successful at the time and what was happening, because everything else was going up, we were going down in numbers.

It turned out in that room, he'd assembled members of HUD, he'd assembled the top echelon of the VA and I can't name the other agencies that were there, but there had to be at least 20 people in that room. It was in the executive offices across the street from the White House.

When you submitted this list to me last night, if you have VA officials coming from D.C., they may have been involved in that meeting. But that had nothing to do with the West LA VA Center. But I want to make full disclosure about the contacts that I've had, because I don't recognize some of your names on the defense part, but they could've been officials from HUD or the VA in that room, and I may say in the middle, you know, I recognize you, you were the room, but the discussion was primarily between Carson and myself, okay.

Now, I'll tell you there was a plan A and a plan B.

I don't know what plan A was, but it was being offered to

Garcetti, mine was supposed to be plan B, that the

administration at that time was going to follow the outfit for

plan A for Los Angeles, whatever plan A is, I have no idea what

that was at the time. Okay?

So in a sense, plan B, our plan got moved off to the

- side. Okay. The reason I bring that all up is you've got two
 people that I've disclosed to you before, Dr. Sharon and
 Dr. Stephen Braverman.
 - And it came to my attention through my special masters and not through this witness list, and you folks have to be aware that I've been involved in several cases involving homeless settlements, so I've probably talked to 4 to 500 people in this city literally and I'm not under estimating that, from county to city officials, to staffers to fire department to police to you name it.

And now we have a case that's a subset of that, the homeless population or homeless veterans in the VA. I don't recall, I think I can represent, that I've never had a conversation about your West LA facility, other than Stephen Braverman, and I'm going to come to that in just a moment.

First, your motion came to me concerning Dr. Sherin, which we're going to take up today and I knew him as the director of the mental health facilities here and he was involved and sat in the audience and gave testimony and I call it the El Doplin Hotel (phonetic), but it's some hotel here in the city.

And I know him professionally from that testimony. He'd also introduced me to Doctor or to -- who's the UCLA Chancellor that just left?

MR. SILBERFELD: Gene Block.

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MR. ROSENBAUM: Darrell Steinberg. THE COURT: I got a call from Steinberg, complete disclosure to you, who wanted to talk about what was happening in Los Angeles and I wanted to know what was happening up in Sacramento, because initially their stats looked pretty good. So he flew down and I wasn't aware, but he assembled In that audience was Sherin sitting there as one of a Board. his board members. I represent to you there was no discussion about West LA or the veterans, nor did I know he would be a witness at the time until now I see him on the witness list. So I want complete disclosure about that. I also guarantee you that I will recognize more than one witness in this trial, if we have this trial. But I will fully disclose to you what my involvement is with that witness and if there's been any representation. And I'm going to ask are any of you going to call a person named Stephen Peck? Gregory Peck's son? No, Your Honor. MR. ROSENBERG: THE COURT: Boomerang? Okay. Okay. I've had discussions with him about the VA because he actually came to Orange County and testified on behalf of veterans and their treatment along the Santa Ana riverbed, but he's not a witness for either one of you; is that correct? MR. ROSENBAUM: No, Your Honor.

He runs an organization down there

Okay.

that's part of a builder, but we haven't gotten into the financing, I don't really understand it yet in total, except through your briefing, but if he's testifying, he's a former colleague in the Marine Corps who I know and beyond that, I don't recognize any of the other names.

But I could have VA officials come in, depending upon who you're calling out of D.C. who was part of that effort although it was a different administration, because I don't know the capacity that they were serving in, okay. And I certainly know Sherin from past dealings with him in terms of the mental health, in fact, we've been on different sides of different issues. Because I'm consistently asked why don't we have more mental health, and his explanation at the time was through the Mercer Report, that he's asked for that.

And our conversation centered around not veterans, but the fact that he had asked way back when the Mercer Report occurred, where at least 500 mental health, acute by the way, mental health mixed with subacute in 2018 or 2019.

The county initially said he could have them, but only supplied 164, which I have to think was very frustrating for him. He was also asking for 3,000 and depending upon the way you read the Mercer Report, it's either 3,500 or 3,000, because there's a 500 -- not a program, of acute, and he recognized he didn't want more because he hoped that they would move to subacute, but he needed 3,000 additional spaces, the

county wasn't giving it to him. In other words, he felt his hands were tied at the time.

And so in another case, in another hearing that you may not be aware of involving the county this Court took the position and relied heavily on this Mercer Report that

Dr. Sherin and I talked about ad nauseum about the resources he needed but weren't being voted on by the county.

Now intermixed with all of this, is eventually the conflict between the county and the city. And no matter what you say behind the scenes as they all lock arms, they have adverse inferences or adverse positions on many occasions.

And that is the city seems to be stepping forward in terms of architecture, but they can't adequately service your homeless population unless they have the mental health and the substance abuse that goes along with. Do you understand where I'm at? Maybe? Yeah.

Okay. That's a long winded explanation and a complete disclosure to you of the conversations I've had and I expect, folks, I'm going to run across these people because I'm in a monitoring position with the LA Alliance and with the county right now in terms of mental health.

So I could have, although I'm going to try to avoid now that I know he's a witness, even Sherin sitting in the audience. And I certainly don't want to meet with Steve Braverman again if he's going to be a witness. And that's why

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I recently got an invitation to come out to the VA for some
opening, and I turned it down. And if I go out there, I warned
you, because you both invite me, you know, we're in litigation,
okay. So we'll try to avoid all of those in the future.
          Now, do you have any questions of me? If so, that's
the best disclosure I can make ethically to each of you.
         MR. SILBERFELD: Nothing from the plaintiffs, Your
Honor.
          THE COURT:
                     Okay. You folks?
         MR. ROSENBERG: Nothing from the Government, Your
Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me take this issue
concerning the objections regarding the report of Dr. Sherin.
Tentatively, I tend to agree with you on this. I don't see why
this Court would be making a ruling before a deposition.
don't think it's a full and complete record regardless of the
input from the special masters. It may be that I take that
position illegally or I don't. But I'm a little concerned that
I don't have a complete record and the deposition hasn't been
taken, so that you can make a complete record for both of you.
         Now, I assume that you're going to object, so please
object and then let's decide how we're going to do this guickly
and get him in here for testimony.
         MR. SILBERFELD: Certainly. We have no objection to
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Dr. Sherin testifying by deposition and we want to preserve to

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the Government and we've said this multiple times to them both
separately and in front of the special masters, that we want
them to preserve their rights to make Daubert motions --
          THE COURT:
                      Right.
          MR. SILBERFELD: -- or in limine motions as they see
    However, the threat of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 207
that the Government has made against Dr. Sherin requires before
he testifies and deposition is testimony, before he takes an
oath and so much as states his name, he needs at least
protection to that extent so that he is not subject to
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 207.
          So this is a sequencing issue. It is not --
          THE COURT: Okay. Just a moment. How do we
accommodate both of you? How do we give you a complete record
so you can make a fulsome argument and how do we give you that
opposition? Because what's not going to happen is, is he's not
going to be in a position of not being deposed.
          MR. SILBERFELD:
                          We agree.
          THE COURT: He's going to get deposed, so you both
have a record of that and any threat we need to get rid of.
And that way you can decide if he's ethically, you know, bound,
et cetera, you can make a complete record. How do we
accommodate both of you?
          MR. ROSENBERG:
                          So I want to --
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But I'd see you two meeting and

THE COURT:

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    conferring. Walk over to each other, have a conversation
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    first. If not, I can make a decision very quickly for you.
              Oh, by the way, while you're meeting I represent to
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    you, we've been in 25 or 26 encampments involving 5,000 people
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    minimally in Orange County. I know it's unorthodox for a judge
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    to be there, but when a judge is there, we don't have a
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    violence problem. We don't have a problem getting the homeless
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    to go to an accommodation type because the Court's standing
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    there.
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              And I represent to you with 5,000 people in 25 plus
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    encampments, we haven't had one problem. Now here, apparently
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    we don't operate that way. We just have non-invitation from
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    your city council to go out there, fine. But when those 1983
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    cases roll in, or things being confiscated and nobody's there,
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    then it's up to the old adversarial system and nobody's on the
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    spot to stop the violence or to see if possessions are being
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    taken. So the adversarial system isn't working well I think
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    with this homeless issue.
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              MR. ROSENBERG: Just one moment.
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              THE COURT: Oh, take your time. If you don't make
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    the decision, I will. It'll take me one second, okay.
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    govern yourselves before I have to do it.
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         (Pause)
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              MR. SILBERFELD: What we've been discussing is if the
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Government, not the VA, not HUD, and certainly not the

- 1 intervenor, but if the United States Government will concede
- 2 | that his appearance at a deposition is not the basis of any
- 3 | future prosecution, he can testify.
- 4 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, let me take the
- 5 pressure off both of you. Can I make an order --
- 6 MR. SILBERFELD: Yes.
- 7 THE COURT: -- to take the Government off the hook,
- 8 | you know, so you can maintain your position, but we can get the
- 9 deposition --
- 10 MR. SILBERFELD: Right.
- 11 **THE COURT:** -- and you can fully develop a record so
- 12 | that if there is an ethical violation, this training as you've
- 13 | said, was he aware of this, we can get down to the nuts of
- 14 this.
- 15 MR. SILBERFELD: Yeah, the order will solve the
- 16 | problem under 18 U.S.C. 207.
- 17 **THE COURT:** That's just a suggestion, but otherwise,
- 18 | because this deposition by the way is going to take place. I
- 19 | can't get a complete record without it.
- 20 MR. ROSENBERG: So, Your Honor, just a couple of
- 21 points.
- 22 **THE COURT:** No, no, give me -- time out.
- 23 MR. ROSENBERG: First -- yeah.
- 24 **THE COURT:** Give me a solution.
- 25 MR. ROSENBERG: I need to clarify one thing that

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    been.
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              THE COURT: Is that fair for the defendants?
              MR. ROSENBERG: That works for us, Your Honor. I do
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    have a --
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              THE COURT: And that takes you off --
              MR. ROSENBERG: -- housekeeping question.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, that takes you off the hook in
    terms of acquiescing to anything.
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              MR. ROSENBERG: After the deposition is completed,
    the Government would evaluate whether it wants to file a motion
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    in limine --
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              THE COURT:
                          Exactly.
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              MR. ROSENBERG: -- or a Daubert motion.
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                          Bring this right back to me at that time.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. ROSENBERG: So should we -- we're going to have -
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    - I assume that the Court has moved the final pretrial
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    conference from Monday until Tuesday of next week. That final
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    pretrial conference will be two days before the deposition.
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
20
              MR. ROSENBERG: So perhaps we can just discuss the
21
    scheduling of any potential Daubert motion at that time.
22
              THE COURT:
                         Yes.
23
              MR. SILBERFELD: And we'll cooperate on that, not a
24
    problem.
25
              THE COURT:
                           Okay. Now, does that resolve that for
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Barbara Davis part of the West LA Homeowner's Association?

1 MS. SAVAGE: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I received a letter from somebody from the West LA Homeowner's Association a year and a half ago, a

4 year ago when the case first started.

MS. SAVAGE: Was it from a Marcy Schwartz?

6 THE COURT: You know, I don't know. I basically

7 looked at it and over here, I get lots of mail, some good, some

8 not too good. It went over here.

MS. SAVAGE: I doubt that, Your Honor, but that didn't come up in her deposition.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I've got DiFrancisco. My only meeting has been with Gene Block over at UCLA and that generally involved homeless students and what we were going to try to do not only with homeless students at USC and UCLA but also Hilda Solis (phonetic) tried to be active out at Los Angeles because there's a huge number of homeless students who are out there.

On the defendant's witness list, Braverman, who I have contact. Robert Merchant, he could have been part of that group, I just don't know. John Kuhn, could have been part of that group.

And I've been out there on other occasions when the veterans were moved into the VA facility first of all in a parking lot with designated areas, and then eventually into tiny homes, which is just adjacent to the parking lot. And

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1	there could have been some contact, because there's a lot of
2	folks who attended different hearings between the city, the
3	county, HUD was involved at one point with a plan that didn't
4	go very far, an offer being made to the city about four years
5	ago and I can't remember if it was the Biden administration or
6	the Trump administration.
7	Okay. Any questions of me? That's as full of a
8	disclosure I can make, other than all the developers that I've
9	met with that have nothing to do with you.
10	MR. SILBERFELD: No, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Well then let's take the summary
12	judgment motion. Can I get a copy of it? Now, this is a
13	tentative, I want you to be harsh with me, I don't want you to
14	hold back, okay. If you have something to say, don't worry
15	about decorum and be nice, just get right into the argument
16	with no chilling effect. Okay. I don't take things
17	personally, trust me.
18	So, counsel, who would like to speak first? There
19	will be two rounds.
20	MR. ROSENBAUM: I can start, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Please.
22	MR. ROSENBAUM: Is this microphone working?
23	THE COURT: Yes, it is, thank you.
24	MR. ROSENBAUM: Good morning again, Your Honor

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. ROSENBAUM: -- Mark Rosenbaum on behalf of the plaintiffs. We are submitting on all of Your Honor's rulings, with the exception of the AMI ruling and the question of facial discrimination. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROSENBAUM: That's what I'll be addressing. Let me begin by saying as I'm sure all the parties, all counsel for all the parties agree, this is a very thoughtful order, we appreciate it, there was a lot of paper in front of the Court, there always is on an MSJ and we appreciate the time and effort that you and your clerks put into this, thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, as I just indicated and may it please the Court, I want to address the question of the Court's ruling in particular on pages 19 and 20 of the tentative with respect to the AMI matter and the Court's determination that it was going to hold off for another day, hold off for trial. The question about whether or not we're dealing with a policy or practice or program that is facially discriminatory. If the Court please, I want to step back just a moment to lay out some of the background and then get right to the questions of law that Your Honor's order raises.

I want to say with respect to this, and I'm looking

in particular at pages 19 and 20 of the Court's order, where the Court talks about the Government's representations as to our position. Those representations are inaccurate and they have serious legal consequences going to the Court's decision.

This is not about a byzantine set of rules or regulations, it's not about a complicated policy or practice, although as I'm going to demonstrate, the Ninth Circuit has addressed policies and practices and programs and found facial discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act far more complicated than what we are addressing here this morning.

agreement between the parties and with the Court. That is the heart and the soul of this case, as everybody agrees, is bringing an end to the homelessness of disabled veterans by providing permanent support of housing in order that their disability, and that's the key, isn't it, that their disability not impede their access to desperately needed mental health and physical health services, to which they are legally entitled.

The Court acknowledged that this rule, this core issue in our very first meeting. It repeated it eloquently in the order denying the Government's motion to dismiss, it repeats it again in this order, this tentative order today. And we don't understand the VA or HUD to oppose this rule.

But the position of the Veterans Administration and

HUD, as to the imposition of the AMI, the Area Median Income, which counts disability compensation as income for purposes of determining eligibility for permanent support of housing, that position is fatally irreconcilable with the end of ensuring permanent support of housing for unhoused disabled veterans.

It's why this issue is so important to what this case is all about and to what frankly the mission of the federal court is all about.

That is, and this is it in a nutshell, Your Honor, the very disability that must be accommodated so as to secure permanent support of housing is the very reason that our most disabled unhoused veterans cannot access permanent support of housing under the policies and practices of the government.

That's the essence of the VA and HUD position this morning and in its papers. That the policies and practices, the use of disability compensation as income, their position is that is lawful. Your Honor characterized the use of AMI, as I'm describing it at page 25 of the Court's order dismissing their motion as perverse.

And with all respect, Your Honor, that characterization was generous. The position that the Government is taking in this case, turns the Rehabilitation Act and the requirement of permanent support of housing upside down, flips it on its head, says to the most disabled veterans, those most in need of permanent support of housing, you are

ineligible for that housing. And to state that proposition, to state that defense is to refute it.

The encouragement, the acceptance, the reliance by the VA of enhanced use leases, that have baked into them an income limitation that includes this requirement, that disability compensation be treated as part of that income in order to deny eligibility for permanent support of housing on the VA grounds and in project based housing outside the grounds in the community and then separately for HUD vouchers for tenant based permanent supportive housing, Your Honor, that is facial discrimination and it is in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

I want to add, Your Honor, that it is also in violation of 38 CFR Section 15.130(b)(3) that says that the agency may not directly or through contractual or other arrangements utilize as criteria or methods of administration the purpose or effect of which would one, subject qualified individuals with handicaps to discrimination on the basis of handicap, or defeat or substantially impair accomplishments of the objectives of a program or activity with respect to individuals with handicaps. That regulation reinforces what Section 504 mandates.

Let me take care of a little bit of housekeeping with respect to this argument. To begin, for purposes of this motion, Your Honor is aware it states it in the order, every

first law student knows that what we're looking for is those undisputed facts. And the undisputed facts, after extensive discovery, is that inclusion of veterans with the highest disability ratings who are being denied access to permanent supportive housing is one that does inestimable damage to those veterans. Keeps them on the streets, subjects them to worsening of their conditions, results in death, keeps them from access to those services.

Deputy Medical Director John Kuhn testified at pages

Deputy Medical Director John Kunn testified at pages 174 and 175 of his deposition that this was a problem of justice. And that he was not supportive of those income requirements.

Dr. Braverman whom Your Honor just mentioned, the VA, now currently the VA Desert Pacific Healthcare Network director when I deposed him, he said we are limiting some veterans who by their service would most benefit from being in the units.

And when I asked him if that was the position of Secretary McDonough, he said, yes, Secretary McDonough agrees generally that we would like to see a situation in which 100 percent service connected veterans would be able to go into their units and I'm quoting from pages 145 to 146, 147.

Michael Dennis, whom Your Honor also just mentioned is a witness, a listed witness by the Government at page 79 said the same thing. It's undisputed here, Your Honor. It's disputed that as AMI is utilized by the VA and by HUD that a

1 threshold is set, an income limitation is set, which we have no 2 problem with in terms of affordable housing for these purposes, but that income calculation includes disability 3 compensation such that 30 percent AMI, which is where it's set, 4 5 give or take 30 percent, means that those veterans who have the highest disability ratings, those veterans who are most in need 6 7 of permanent supportive housing are categorically made ineligible for permanent supporting housing on the VA grounds and in the project based housing that I described. 10 The evidence is undisputed. I'm referring here to the Harris deposition at page 55, which we've cited. And their 11 12 own Hackold (phonetic) letter that 38 of the 46 buildings where 13 there's permanent supportive housing offered utilize more or 14 less than 30 percent AMI requirement and the result of which is 15 that disability compensation is included, the result of which 16 is that these veterans are excluded. 17 Looking at the VA's own eligibility criteria, looking 18 at their own criteria, the individuals whom we are talking 19 about are first, first among eight priority groups used to 20 determine eligibility for benefits, that's 38 CFR --21 THE COURT: Would you repeat that? 22 MR. ROSENBAUM: Of course. The VA has, as I know 23 Your Honor knows, a set of priorities --24 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

-- and there are eight listed.

The

MR. ROSENBAUM:

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    first in terms of those veterans who are treated as the highest
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    priority are the veterans whom we are -- talked about.
    veterans who have a singular or combined rating of 50 percent
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    or greater, based on one or more service connected
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    disabilities.
                   That's our class. That's who we're talking
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    about and that is who are literally and figuratively out in the
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    cold.
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              THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to stop and
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    ask you a question. This is an naïve question. If I'm 48
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    percent, does this apply?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: You know it depends on the
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    particular --
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              THE COURT: Exactly.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: -- program.
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              THE COURT: If I'm 52 percent. If I'm 52 percent,
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    does it apply?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, yes, yes.
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              THE COURT: Now, in other words, I understand a
19
    hundred percent --
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes.
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              THE COURT:
                         I understand 80 percent.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
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              THE COURT: I'm not sure where that line's drawn.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: The 50 percent is it's the top
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    priority and those individuals would also be ineligible under
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the programs that we're talking about.

THE COURT: All right. I may come back and ask a question about it.

MR. ROSENBAUM: That's fine.

The problem is this, Your Honor. The problem is that the undisputed evidence, and I'm looking at it from the point of view of the way the VA looks at it. I'm not talking about the way that, for example, the low-income housing tax credit program defines it.

The problem is that the VA has said it has outsourced the construction of permanent supportive housing. Your Honor is well aware of that. It has outsourced it and then the developers to whom it has outsourced the construction of that housing has sought funding that imposes these requirements. So the problem is that the VA is saying yes. More than yes, it is encouraging, it is promoting, it is acquiescing. It is saying, go out developers, if that's the funding you get, we've got no problem, notwithstanding the testimony of Kuhn and Braverman and the VA witnesses who see it for what it is.

But the policy, the program, the practice is that the VA is saying that's how it's going to get done on our grounds. And the problem is, when it's off the grounds, the VA is saying for project-based developments that's okay, and that's the problem.

I'm going to come to the vouchers because I can

Why do developers set this standard?

Why

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              THE COURT: I mean in the marketplace, there's no
 2
    choice.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: That's their argument.
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              THE COURT:
                          I see.
                                  Okay.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              And they're also going to say that by
 6
    law --
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              THE COURT: I just want to -- you got a note from
 8
    your --
 9
              MR. ROSENBAUM: -- they can't build and that's
10
    nonsense.
11
              THE COURT: Counsel, counsel -- you got a note from
12
    your colleague. Look to your right -- or your left. Go to
13
    your left, there's a note. Now read your note. He's helping
14
    you.
15
              MR. ROSENBAUM: And the VA says it can't build
16
    itself.
17
              THE COURT: It can't build itself.
18
                              That's what it says and I'm going to
              MR. ROSENBAUM:
19
    address that as well.
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              THE COURT: Now, is there any VA program in the
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    country where there's direct financing by the VA? Or is it all
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    developer -- in other words is West L.A. the outlier? Is it
2.3
    the norm? I don't know across the country nor do I know what
24
    I'm going to hear, and I'm looking through these papers at a
25
    summary judgment motion. And I'm asking you, is this the norm?
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- 1 Is this -- the position of the VA, which I'm going to ask,
- 2 | nationwide or is this an outlier situation with West L.A.?
- 3 Okay?
- 4 MR. ROSENBAUM: The -- let me answer on behalf of
- 5 Plaintiffs that question. It's an important question. The
- 6 answer is so far as we know, the VA has taken the position
- 7 across the board that it cannot build.
- 8 THE COURT: And my question once again is that
- 9 locally or nationally?
- 10 MR. ROSENBAUM: That's nationally.
- 11 **THE COURT:** So that's a national policy, you believe?
- 12 MR. ROSENBAUM: That's my understanding, Your Honor.
- 13 | And the VA has also taken the position that it's going to
- 14 | outsource to developers --
- 15 **THE COURT:** So I'm going to repeat back to you what I
- 16 just absorbed. I just absorbed the following, so you know what
- 17 | I'm absorbing. Judge, there's a national policy that this can
- 18 only be development through a developer with credits and they
- 19 | will set the standard.
- 20 MR. ROSENBAUM: Not quite. The VA has said -- I
- 21 apologize if I wasn't sufficiently clear. The first part of
- 22 | what you said, I agree with. The VA has said we have to
- 23 outsource this. The VA has not said that the developers have
- 24 to utilize LIHTC or any program to get them those tax credits
- 25 | that include disability counting as income. But the Government

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    has said where the developers, as Your Honor acutely points
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    out, has said, look, where developers say this is the way we
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    want to go. We want to -- we want those tax credits, and the
    state and the local entities that are in charge of allocating
 4
 5
    the benefits and financing this have put these requirements in.
    Those requirements include using disability compensation as
 6
 7
    income.
              And what the VA has said across the board is that's
 9
    okay with us. And that's the problem here.
                                                  That the
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    Government cannot outsource what section 504 requires and
11
    what -- as I started my argument this morning, that everybody
12
    agrees that permanent supportive housing has to be done, not
13
    just as a moral matter, but in order to satisfy 504. That's
14
    the genius of Your Honor's order denying the motion to dismiss.
15
              And what is an across-the-board policy is that where
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    they outsource it to developers, developers go to state and
17
    local entities to get the financing. The financing comes back
18
    with a requirement that disability income be included, knocking
19
    out eligibility for the most disabled veterans. The VA's
20
    position is it's okay with us. Not our doing.
21
              THE COURT: And is this a uniform policy to your
22
    knowledge --
23
              MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, it is.
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              THE COURT: -- across the country?
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Yes, it is.

MR. ROSENBAUM:

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Circuit cases.

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THE COURT:
                     Is there any direct financing by the VA
that doesn't depend upon developer credits? In other words,
was VA financing it themselves?
         MR. ROSENBAUM: Not that I'm aware of.
          THE COURT:
                     In other words, you're a developer.
the VA. I'm going to offer you the following. You build it
for $300,000, you get $100,000 profit or whatever.
         MR. ROSENBAUM: Great question. The Government says
in its brief, it uses the word typically. It says typically
that's what they do. Are there some outlying questions?
                     I'll ask them.
          THE COURT:
         MR. ROSENBAUM: I -- you can ask. But Your Honor is
on to something really important, which is the VA says our
hands are tied. We don't build. We can't build. And what the
VA says with respect to the financing is they want to do it.
It's okay. And that's the problem. You cannot outsource
discrimination. You cannot outsource discrimination.
          When I read the regs, that's exactly what the regs
say. You cannot contract in a way that permits discrimination
in violation of our most basic anti-discrimination disability
laws. And that's the problem.
          Now, there are three cases, Your Honor, that dispose
of this issue, that address these issues. And with Your
Honor's patience, I want to go through those three Ninth
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The first case is the BAART case, Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, 1999 decision of the Ninth Circuit by Judge Tashima. And Judge Tashima in this decision teaches us how to construe these issues, how to look at these issues. And as Your Honor correctly places -- Your Honor cites BAART in its tentative order. And Your Honor completely gets correctly what the issue is here with facial discrimination. How do you figure it out? And at page 734 of the BAART decision, the Court says, look, there is no issue of reasonable modification whether the Plaintiff's proposed solution would constitute a reasonable or unreasonable modification. Why is that? Because the Court says, and I'm quoting now, "The only modification of a facially discriminatory law that would avoid discrimination on the basis of disability would be the actual removal of the portion of the law that discriminates on the basis of disability." Such an important proposition. And Your Honor will recall that in BAART, the Court was looking at a policy of Antioch, California that said that there would be no construction of methadone clinics within 500 feet of residential areas. And what Judge Tashima did in walking through this 504 case was to say, look, there's nothing on the face of that zoning requirement that mentions disability, that includes

disability. At page 733 of the decision, the Court

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    specifically says you don't have to do it. It's a functional
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    test. What's going on here?
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              And in BAART, which held the facial discrimination to
    void that Antioch ordinance, the Court said the impact of that,
 4
 5
    the consequence of that, is that if you suffer from a
 6
    disability --
 7
              THE COURT: BAART wasn't a summary judgment motion
 8
    though, was it?
 9
              MR. ROSENBAUM: Say it again.
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              THE COURT: This decision wasn't handed down and
11
    given to Judge Tashima on a summary judgment.
12
              MR. ROSENBAUM: No, but it tells us what the rule is.
13
              THE COURT: Okay. It tells us what the rule is, but
14
    here we're at a summary judgment. And the issue for the Court
    as a gatekeeper is there a material issue of fact.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: All right. So let's go to the second
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    case and that's the Townsend case. That case is not cited in
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MR. ROSENBAUM: All right. So let's go to the second case and that's the <u>Townsend</u> case. That case is not cited in Your Honor's tentative order. That's a decision 2003 by Judge Berzon and the facts of that case are very close to the facts of our case. In the <u>Townsend</u> case --

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THE COURT: Is this from a -- is this off of a summary judgment? I think here Townsend, if my memory is correct, is a developed record once again after trial, but I want you to check. I could be wrong. One of you do that for me?

Mr. Townsend was a diabetic. He had peripheral vascular disease. He was a bilateral amputee. He was in his 80s. And Mr. Townsend's income increased by \$46. That moved him out of the categorically needy under the Washington health care scheme and moved it into a category that was called medically needy.

THE COURT: You dropped your voice. Medically?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Medically needy. And when it went to medically needy, the nature of Mr. Townsend's health care went from a location where he could get residential treatment, where he was within a residential community, to a community where all the state had to show was that it had reasonable standards that comported with the purpose of the Medicaid Act, and that therefore Washington had discretion as to what it wanted to do.

And once Townsend's income moved just over that level, Townsend went from categorically needy to medically needy, and the State of Washington said to him, you have to move to a nursing home or you're going to lose your Medicaid benefits. And Townsend's argument was, once you move me to that nursing home, then I'm going to be segregated within the meaning of Section 504 and I'm going to have my rights under the Rehabilitation Act denied. And so he was saying, I am being moved from a disability -- a long-term care situation that was community-based into this nursing home.

Now Townsend's lawyers litigated the case as a

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    disparate impact case. But what is key to the Court's ruling
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    and what is dispositive of this case is Footnote 2. Footnote
    2, Judge Berzon says this, Washington's law explicitly
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    providing only nursing home based long-term care services to
 4
 5
    the medically needy may be read to facially discriminate
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    against disabled persons because those who are in need of the
 7
    kind of long-term assistance at issue here, for example,
 8
    assistance in performing essential life activities, are
    disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
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              Now Your Honor's tentative -- I mean no disrespect to
11
    the Court.
              THE COURT: Be disrespectful, don't worry about
12
13
    that.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: All right. Well, then I'm going to
15
    let it go.
16
              THE COURT: Just get to the argument. I want these
17
    arguments with vigor from both sides. Don't worry about
18
    offending me.
19
              MR. ROSENBAUM: Okay. I'm about to offend you.
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              THE COURT:
                          Good.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: The Government's argument that this
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    complicated financing, this Byzantine financing, there's never
23
    been a case that looked anything like it, is wrong, wrong,
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    wrong, wrong. Because in the Townsend case, the Court, in
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- facial discrimination argument, the Court had to dig in and see
 what was involved there.
- It had to do three things. It had to look at the
- 4 Medicaid statute. It had to look at the Washington
- 5 Administrative Code defining income categories. It had to look
- 6 at the Medicare waiver program requiring medically needy
- 7 persons to receive care in nursing homes. It had to go through
- 8 all of that.
- 9 But, Your Honor, I'll be straight with the Court,
- 10 | that's not a big deal. What the Court was saying was that the
- 11 | argument, as I understand the Government to make in this case,
- 12 | that you've got to spell out disability in the policy or
- 13 practice or the statute or the rule that you're talking about,
- 14 | it doesn't make any sense. Because the issue is, going back to
- 15 BAART, can you change that rule without removing what the
- 16 | statute or the ordinance or the rule or the policy is all
- 17 about?
- 18 **THE COURT:** Just one moment. Do you folks need to go
- 19 to lunch? Goodbye. See you at one o'clock. You're
- 20 banished. Go to lunch. We know how to operate that, believe
- 21 | it or not. That magic machine. No, no, no. I'm not going to
- 22 be accused of abuse, Michael. No, you're banished. Colin,
- 23 come up and operate this thing.
- Do you folks want to go through the lunch and finish
- 25 at least this argument and this segment and then grab a quick

- 1 bite to eat? And the same courtesy to you, no disturbance on
- 2 your side? Can we do that?
- 3 MR. KNAPP: I'm fine, Judge.
- 4 THE COURT: Okay? You okay? All right.
- 5 I'm insisting. That's an order. The court reporter,
- 6 go have a nice lunch. Just make sure that that continues on.
- 7 Will -- Una, come up and operate this.
- 8 And if you're that way, counsel, I'll ask after you
- 9 conclude your argument, so we can have one segment, okay? So
- 10 please continue.
- 11 MR. ROSENBAUM: I appreciate the courtesy.
- 12 **THE COURT:** And if you need lunch at any time, just
- 13 tell me.
- MR. ROSENBAUM: Got it. So my point is this, Your
- 15 Honor, what BAART and especially Townsend teach us, see, you
- 16 | don't look for specific language that cries out with a
- 17 disability. Obviously, that's facial. But there's no way that
- 18 Judge Berzon and the Court could have found facial
- 19 discrimination in terms of what was going on in the State of
- 20 Washington and its health care system without looking at the
- 21 three measures that I talked about, without figuring out how
- does this really work. What's really happening here? Is this
- 23 a situation where if you take the disability impact out, the
- 24 policy remains? That's what reasonable modifications are
- 25 about. Can you find a reasonable modification and keep it?

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This is different. This asks the question, can you remove what is the offending problem here and the policy and practice or statute stays? And you can't do that in our situation any more than you could do it in Townsend. what was baked into medically needy was that you had to go to a nursing home. And that was the segregation problem. If you change the definition of medically needy so that individuals could get residential treatment in a way that they could be integrated, it wasn't medically needy anymore. (Court confers with Clerk) MR. ROSENBAUM: You with me, Your Honor? THE COURT: Not yet. MR. ROSENBAUM: Okay. THE COURT: Let's make that the transition. MR. ROSENBAUM: Okay. I want my staff to at least have lunch. THE COURT: MR. ROSENBAUM: Just don't tell Ms. Savage that she can leave. THE COURT: See, Carlin's so loyal, she'll stay. And so will the court reporter. So I'm going to have you just wait because they're going to go have lunch. Okay. Thank you very much, Counsel. MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor. So my point -- my last point with respect to Townsend, just to bear with me and let me repeat and simplify,

- 1 | my point is this. Townsend cannot exist, that footnote, that
- 2 definition cannot exist with their definition of facially
- 3 discriminatory.
- 4 **THE COURT:** I haven't thoroughly examined
- 5 Townsend. I promise I'll go back and look at it again.
- 6 MR. ROSENBAUM: Great. Great. But the case turns,
- 7 | in terms of facial discrimination, on the distinction between
- 8 categorically needy and medically needy. And the problem
- 9 was --
- 10 **THE COURT:** Counsel, you believe that there's no
- 11 | material issue of fact, and you're more comfortable from your
- 12 position, even if you were right, and I'm not saying you are at
- 13 | all, that the Court should hand this down at summary judgment
- 14 and not develop a record at trial?
- 15 MR. ROSENBAUM: I am comfortable that this is classic
- 16 | facial discrimination.
- 17 **THE COURT:** And why wouldn't I develop a record at
- 18 | trial? In other words, as you say, this is Byzantine from your
- 19 | viewpoint.
- 20 MR. ROSENBAUM: I'm not saying it is Byzantine. I'm
- 21 | saying it's not Byzantine. I'm saying there's nothing
- 22 Byzantine about it.
- 23 **THE COURT:** Well, the financing is Byzantine, you
- 24 said.
- 25 MR. ROSENBAUM: But the issue isn't how -- you know,

the fact that the developers intend to use LIHTC. That's not
the issue.

THE COURT: Okay. If you're comfortable with summary judgment, please continue.

MR. ROSENBAUM: As I said, the issue, which isn't Byzantine at all, is that the Government says you can do that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENBAUM: And the language in LIHTC is clear that disability compensation will be treated as income. End of story. We don't need to take apart LIHTC. That's not the issue here.

The issue is what they are outsourcing as their basis and blessing and saying this is okay. And, Your Honor, first of all, it is a matter of classic facial discrimination. And I would not be doing my duty otherwise if I did not say that.

But the other point is there isn't any factual dispute here. There's no dispute that this is the methodology that's being utilized. There is no dispute that if you're 100 percent disabled, 90 percent disabled in that top category, you're gone. You're on the streets. You can't qualify for this housing. There's no dispute on it. There's nothing to try a case about on that because there's no factual dispute.

They can't say that 100 percent disabled people can get permanent supportive housing. That's what's so powerful about the testimony of Kuhn and Braverman and Dennis. They

1 acknowledged it. They don't like it. They said it has
2 precisely the impact.

So at the end of the trial, we're not going to be one jot further in terms of developing the record. The record is set. That's the way it goes.

THE COURT: Except you take this from depositional testimony that the Court would rely upon in making such a ruling. And depositions aren't of any great value because oftentimes, one side pursues aggressively and the other side simply lays back if they're their witness and they don't examine at all.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I invite Your Honor -- first of all, these are experienced counsel. But I invite Your Honor to look at that deposition testimony again.

THE COURT: I will again.

MR. ROSENBAUM: There's no wiggle room there. And frankly, that's what Kuhn said. That's what Braverman said. That's what Dennis said. That's what the secretary said. If it were up to us, we think it's a matter of justice. We acknowledge that these individuals don't qualify. There's nothing to develop here because those facts are clear. And you're dealing with very experienced counsel here.

And they didn't cross-examine their witness and say, well, you didn't really mean it. Actually, if you look at the testimony, if I remember it right on Braverman, when I asked

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    him, what's the position of the secretary? And he said, that's
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    in agreement with what I'm saying. And then Mr. Knapp did ask
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    a question. Take a look at Mr. Knapp's question. And
    Mr. Knapp says, did you mean that that's what the secretary
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    said and believe? And he says, yes, the secretary agrees.
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              So we can have a one-month trial. We can have a ten-
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    month trial. It's not -- that record's not going to change.
              Let me go to the third case, Your Honor. And the
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    third case is Lovell. Now --
              THE COURT: Just a moment. So my record would be the
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    hearsay statement that the secretary agrees.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, I'd say -- I'd say --
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              THE COURT: On a summary judgment motion.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: I'd say it's a statement against
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    interest, because their position is that what they're doing is
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    lawful.
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              THE COURT: But if the Court goes forward and if
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    there is a material issue of fact --
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: That was pretty cool, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- I would certainly have a developed
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    record in the trial, wouldn't I?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, I don't mean to be
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    disrespectful, but I'm a good lawyer. Mr. Silberfeld is a
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    terrific lawyer. We can't do any better than what the record
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is now.

It dealt with the Hawaii health insurance program.

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had gone from a fee-for-services program to an HMO program.

Then Hawaii set up this program called Quest. And Quest said, if an income did not exceed 300 percent of federal policy level, then you could take advantage of it. You could enroll in Quest unless you were ABD: aged, blind, or disabled.

Now, I will concede that that's direct in the sense that the disability is mentioned, which did not happen in BAART and certainly didn't happen in Townsend.

But I bring Lovell to Your Honor's attention as to understanding the rule here. Because Lovell cites BAART, cites the very pages of BAART that I've been relying upon. And at page 1053, Judge Fletcher says, it is undisputed that disabled people who but for their disability were eligible for health care benefits from the state under Quest are categorically excluded.

That's our problem. That's our problem. But for the disability, but for the disability compensation that follows from that disability, our folks could be able to take advantage of the permanent supportive housing.

At page 1045, the Court says, the State excluded ABD persons from Quest because, "the lack of actuarial data and the anticipated high cost due to their special needs produce a lack of predictability, which would result in health care insurers refusing to participate in Quest. The State asserts that it would be unable to implement the program without such

providers."

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And I raise that with the Court because that mimics the Government's argument here. The Government says, and I'm going to come to it in a moment -- the Government says, our hands are tied. And Your Honor very astutely points out in terms of what the policy is, what they're saying is off the table.

And in the <u>Lovell</u> case, the Ninth Circuit says, we don't get to that question. We don't get to that question at all because that's what it means to have facial discrimination.

Now, let me say this. If you think about it -- if you think about it, what the Government is saying here is, we can't give permanent supportive housing to those individuals who are most in need of permanent supportive housing. That's their argument.

If Your Honor goes on the VA grounds, the 233 units that are there, those units disqualify the most disabled veterans. That's what I meant when I said Your Honor was generous when Your Honor said that what is taking place here is perverse. Perverse looks good compared to what this is. This is cruel. This is insane that you would keep out those individuals who are most in need of the housing.

Now, I don't need to do this, but let me just say this, Your Honor, with respect to the argument that they make

in their pages that they can't build housing and they cite to the West L.A. Leasing Act, I hope when counsel gets up, they can show me that language.

Because here's what the West L.A. Leasing Act says in 2016. Section 2(a), the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may carry out leases described in section (b) at the Department of Veteran Affairs West L.A. campus. And then (b) lists as the first one, (b)(1), building permanent supportive housing.

That's not a ban. That just says here's one avenue that you can get permanent supportive housing. And how I know I'm right on that? Well, one reason I know I'm right on that is because that's what it says textually.

The second reason I know about it is that it would be bizarre if the VA is saying to this Court, we know we have a duty to supply permanent supportive housing. We just can't get the people who are most disabled. And the law makes us do that. Could Congress ever conceive it? Congress knows how to say must. Congress knows how to say this is the exclusive method. And it didn't do it.

And look at part (b)(2), (b)(2) talks about the other uses of the leases. And it lists (A) through (I) examples: promotion of health and wellness, education, vocational training, peer activities, assistance with legal issues, volunteerism, transportation, family support services, other services and support.

Your Honor, the VA satisfies those all the time through methods other than EULs. Clearly, this isn't a prohibition or the VA could subsidize these rents. There's nothing in the law here. There's nothing in common sense that says that they couldn't subsidize it. There's nothing in common sense that says if you want to outsource this, then my God, how many vets die while this outsourcing is taking place because they have to be on the streets?

But if they want to say there's outsourcing, they could say you can outsource, but you can't use a method -- you can't use a method that discriminates in doing so. Their own reg says it. Common sense says it. As I said, that's why it's facial discrimination. If they want to subsidize it, they can subsidize it. If they want to build it themselves, they can build it themselves. If they want to do general contracting, they can do that. But they've chosen not to do that.

And what they can't do is choose a method that says you could use a method that you know the way it works out is that the most disabled are discriminated against any more than they could say you can outsource it to someone that will keep blacks or women out of permanent supportive housing.

And the last point I want to make is this, Your

Honor. I haven't talked much about the tenant-based

housing. There, HUD has lifted the requirement to 80 percent

income. And the Government's argument in its brief is, well,

1 by lifting it to 80 percent, which tells you, by the way, what 2 happens at 50 percent and 30 percent, but by lifting it to 80 percent, they say in their brief, well, we got 97 percent of 3 the vets. That's their interpretation of 504? That you can 4 5 serve 97 percent? That's cold comfort to the 3 percent. 6 And in fact, if the difference is that small, then 7 damn it, they should be covered as well. And that is facial 8 discrimination as well, because their HUD -- they have 9 vouchers. 10 THE COURT: And the three percent would be your most 11 disabled? 12 MR. ROSENBAUM: Exactly right. Which is another 13 answer, and my final point, Your Honor, you've been very 14 courteous with time with me. And that's my final point, which is, why should we do 15 16 it now? One, it's because the law requires it. Because this 17 is facial discrimination. They cannot distinguish these 18 They can't distinguish common sense in terms of how 19 they work. But it's time to bring to an end. 20 I can read to Your Honor, we cited it, President 21 Biden, President Trump, Secretary McDonough, Secretary 22 Fudge. Look, I give you the press releases, I give you their 23 statements, give you the budget, plenty of money about housing, 24 plenty of money about homelessness. In fact, in the press

statement from the President, bullet point five, our \$369

billion budget proposal. \$369 billion. That's not chump
change.

Bullet five says, bolster efforts to end veteran homelessness. The VA and the Biden-Harris Administration believe that every veteran, not 97 percent, certainly not the ones with respect to the housing, every veteran should have permanent, safe, and sustainable housing with access to health care. Was that just rhetoric?

Their legal position is, well, yeah, that's what the President says. But if we want to do less than 100 percent, fine.

It is so important for this Court to say, based on the undisputed facts that describe a policy and a practice which their own people condemn, it is so important for a federal court to say, now, this has got to stop. We cannot use eligibility requirements that say to our most disabled who have served their country and picked up, as Your Honor has said over and over and over again, the most grievous wounds the Government can leave you out of permanent supportive housing by a facial policy and program that says you are not eligible.

Frankly, Your Honor, I can't think of a more important statement for this Court to make and the time to make it is now. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now go over and consult with your colleagues, make certain that you've covered

- all of the arguments in the first round. There'll be a second round.
- 3 MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you.

- **THE COURT:** So just step over for a moment as a courtesy and consult with your colleagues.
- 6 MR. ROSENBAUM: One moment, Your Honor.

I just want to reinforce -- I just want to reinforce a point, which is all the points I made to Your Honor about how the facts play out in terms of this policy, whether this income limitation is given, there isn't any dispute about it. They dispute whether or not they have any other alternatives. I have -- I don't -- and it's facial discrimination. I don't have to deal with that. Your Honor doesn't have to deal with that. That's what Lovell is all about.

Even when Hawaii said, you know, the walls will come crumbling down, the Court said, we don't have to deal with that. But in fact, that's a falsehood too. But in terms of the core legal issue, this is wrapped in a bow for a summary judgment motion, and I encourage the Court to look at the cases and the deposition testimony I talk about, ask them if in fact the income requirements are other than what I've described, and then I implore the Court to rule on behalf of these Plaintiffs.

Nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Counsel,
what are you comfortable with? Are you comfortable arguing now

- 1 | that we've been discussing so far today. My colleague,
- 2 Mr. Lowenstein, will address the other Rehabilitation Act
- 3 | claims. And then at the end, I'll come back and wrap us up with
- 4 the trust issues.
- 5 THE COURT: Okay. And there'll be two rounds
- 6 also. The next round will be shorter, though.
- 7 MR. KNAPP: So I do want to start off with just a
- 8 | couple of framing remarks. The Department of Veterans Affairs
- 9 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development are
- 10 | committed to ending veterans homelessness. The redevelopment
- 11 of the VA's West Los Angeles campus is a piece of that set of
- 12 efforts by the agencies. And those agencies' efforts are
- 13 bearing fruit.
- I mean, if we compare veterans homelessness rates
- 15 | from 2010 to now, veterans homelessness has decreased by over
- 16 | 50 percent. If you compare last year's pit count numbers to
- 17 | this year's pit count numbers, actually, it looks like veterans
- 18 homelessness has decreased by over a third. Whereas,
- 19 homelessness across the board for other populations has only
- 20 decreased by 2 percent.
- 21 So with that framing, the federal government is
- 22 engaged on these issues, cares about them, and I understand
- 23 Plaintiffs' claims. They are well-meaning, but they threaten
- 24 | to disrupt and distract from those efforts.
- As to the AMI issues, my friend, Mr. Rosenbaum, has

- 1 | focused on the facial discrimination claim that they've
- 2 | raised. I'll note -- the way that you can tell that this isn't
- 3 | a facial discrimination issue is that their subclass
- 4 representative is housed on the campus.
- 5 Nothing in the complex interactions between HUD's
- 6 income definition, between the VA's Enhanced Use Leasing
- 7 Authority, and between the state and local funding streams that
- 8 developers utilize when they contract for those Enhanced Use
- 9 Leases to construct housing on the campus, categorically
- 10 excludes individuals on the basis of their disabilities. Those
- 11 | are income-based limitations.
- 12 And nothing about the disability benefits that are
- 13 paid by VA to individuals who have a service-connected
- 14 disability excludes them from the VASH program that provides
- 15 | them with housing assistance and supportive services alongside
- 16 their housing.
- 17 I'll just give Your Honor some numbers. I mean, the
- 18 HUD-VASH program allows participants, and in fact HUD is now
- 19 mandating that PHAs permit individuals to obtain vouchers up to
- 20 80 percent of the area median income. In Los Angeles, that's
- 21 about \$70,000 for one adult.
- 22 An individual with 100 percent service-connected
- 23 disability, their benefit amounts to about \$43,000, well below
- 24 | the 80 percent threshold that HUD sets and that actually is the
- 25 | limit for participation in the HUD-VASH program.

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person.

There's nothing about the VASH program itself that resembles the cases that Mr. Rosenbaum has cited to you today. In each of those cases: Townsend --THE COURT: Lovell, BAART --MR. KNAPP: -- Lovell -- or Lovell and BAART, in each case there was a categorical exclusion that could not be disentangled from an individual's disabled status. In Lovell, it was -- I mean, the regulation straight up said, if you are blind, you cannot participate. Townsend, it was a distinction between medically needy and categorically needy. Those are categorizations that changed solely based on disability. Here, the important, the actual eligibility criteria is income. Now, in conjunction with other sources of income, it can be the case that a veteran makes too much money when you combine other benefits they might be entitled to, other earned income or assets that they have earnings on, when those combine with benefits that they get from VA, that can sometimes push them over the eligibility thresholds for a HUD-VASH voucher. But that is not about -- that's not a distinction that HUD, VA, or anyone has made based on their disability. It's about their income, because this is a program for low-income individuals, and the closer you get to an average income, the less likely you are to be a low-income

I'll also just note, to the extent that there are impacts on the campus with the permanent supportive housing that is currently available on the campus, where some individuals with 100 percent service-connected disability can't access those, those aren't traceable to VA and HUD. They are a result, as Your Honor lays out in this order, and as Your Honor has referenced today, of a complex set of interactions between the various funding streams that developers rely upon in order to construct that housing.

Now, plaintiffs suggest that the way around that is for VA to effectively not contract with developers who use those funding streams. The end result of that would be no permanent supportive housing on the campus. They point to no example anywhere in the country where the VA has been able to utilize developers who don't rely on those state and local funding streams.

Simply put --

THE COURT: Just a little louder, just because we have CourtSmart.

MR. KNAPP: Simply put, there would be no means of constructing this housing. You know, they say -- I actually don't know where they think the money would come, other than an express appropriation from Congress, to construct housing directly, and Congress has not done that. They don't point to any authority that authorizes the VA to directly construct

housing.

And as Your Honor is well familiar, federal agencies are creatures of statute. They can't act beyond them. And if you can't point to a direct authorization from Congress that says, construct housing, and here's a pot of money to do it with, there's just no authority to do it.

As to HUD, I really do struggle to see what the theory of liability is as to that agency. HUD has mandated that PHAs, including the local PHAs here in Los Angeles, allow participation in the HUD-VASH program up to an 80 percent income threshold. I believe that would include, certainly, based on the numbers that I read to you earlier, any individual who was solely receiving disability benefits from VA would allow them to obtain a voucher.

We -- to the point that Your Honor was making earlier, that there may be evidence that would come into trial to help give some context to these issues, and help the Court understand how they're working on the ground, we heard, I believe it was last week, I'm losing track of time, but HACLA has indicated to us that they've actually had success with tenant-based vouchers with the new payment standards that HUD has authorized, which authorized payment up to 160 percent of the fair market rent in the zip codes around the West Los Angeles VA campus, that they've had success with veterans finding units there and being able to use their vouchers.

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So this isn't a situation where permanent supportive housing on the campus is the only way to be proximate to the services that the veterans are seeking. I'll also note, this is an issue that seems to have shifted a bit. I've always understood Plaintiff's claim to be for medical services. The reason that they require housing on or near the campus is so that they can access medical services. But the way I've heard the argument framed this morning is that housing is the service that they want. And I don't think that that's a proper framing, and I don't think that the Rehabilitation Act makes that sort of relief available to them. I'll also note, with just one final point, and I'll entertain any questions Your Honor might have for me, but it's not like the federal government has ignored this problem. And I will say, VA and HUD appreciate that it's an unintended consequence of this complex set of interactions, and they're engaged in trying to solve the issue on behalf of veterans. So VA, HUD, and Treasury are working on a legislative fix to propose to Congress that would, in effect, resolve the limitations imposed under the low-income housing tax credit program. THE COURT: And what is that? MR. KNAPP: It would fix the low-income housing tax credit issue.

How?

THE COURT:

MR. KNAPP: By excluding veterans' benefits for
purposes of accessing project-based housing that is constructed
using that source of income. Now, that doesn't completely
solve the issue because the state and local funding streams
come with their own attachments. HUD is engaged with local
authorities, so is VA.
I mean, this is an issue that our clients are talking
to local authorities about, how they can amend their own
regulations to free up that funding so that it doesn't have
this unintended impact. Those are efforts that are ongoing.
This is an issue that we want to solve. It's just not one that
we can solve through the Rehabilitation Act.
And if Your Honor has any questions for me on the AMI
issue, I'm happy to entertain them. Otherwise
THE COURT: Let me wait. Let me come back if I do.
And thank you.
And would you state your name for the record? I know
who you are from the initial introduction, but just because we
have CourtSmart.
MR. LOWENSTEIN: Of course, Your Honor. Jody
Lowenstein for the Defendants.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. LOWENSTEIN: As my colleague, Mr. Knapp, said,
I'll be addressing Defendants' motion for summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff's first and third causes of action alleged

under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. And I'd like to take the third cause of action first, which we refer to in our briefing as Plaintiff's meaningful access claim.

And I think it'd be helpful, before getting into the issues and responding to some of the points in Your Honor's tentative, to step back and discuss a little bit about how a Section 504 meaningful access claim works and then how that maps onto what Plaintiffs are alleging.

So the starting point is the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Choate</u>. <u>Choate</u> explained that only unjustifiable disparate impacts that have the effect of denying disabled individuals meaningful access to their benefits rises to the level of actionable discrimination under Section 504. And as <u>Choate</u> itself explains, unjustifiable disparate impacts are those that can be remedied by a reasonable modification of the challenged policy.

Now, the Ninth Circuit, in cases like <u>Zukle</u> and <u>Payan</u>, make clear that a plaintiff must identify a reasonable modification, and this is a principle cited in Your Honor's tentative, to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under Section 504. In other words, absent a reasonable modification requested by the plaintiffs, there is no Section 504 discrimination.

So what do Plaintiffs allege here? Their meaningful access claim, in essence, alleges, as I understand it, that

Defendants have a policy of not providing enough permanent supportive housing units on or near the West L.A. campus to house the entire class, a policy they contend effectively prevents class members from meaningfully accessing their disability health care benefits.

But the question presented by Defendant's motion accepts, just for argument's sake, the premises underlying those allegations. But the meaningful access claim would still fail, even if accepting the truth of those allegations because Plaintiffs have not identified a reasonable modification of the challenged policy that is necessary to provide meaningful access. That is an essential element of their Section 504 meaningful access claim for which they bear the burden of production.

Now what Plaintiffs do request by way of a modification is an affirmative injunction from this Court requiring VA to develop 4,000 permanent supportive housing units on the West LA campus within the next six years, a three-fold increase in the number of units that VA currently has planned for the campus and to have VA maintain and support those units thereafter.

Now that's derived from the reports of three proffered experts, all three of which -- from Plaintiffs, all three of which seemingly have the collective opinion that that's what's necessary.

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So the question in resolving Defendants' motion for summary judgment is, is there a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether or not that is a reasonable modification. And there's really two ways of looking at that issue. First, Plaintiffs did not even attempt to defend the reasonableness of their requested modification in opposing Defendants' motion, despite bearing the burden of proof on that issue. I don't see anywhere where they explain why requiring VA to increase the number of planned units on the campus from 1,215 permanent supportive housing units to 4,000 is a reasonable modification. I see no argument in their brief. see no evidence to support that. Now what Plaintiffs do do, and Your Honor respectfully -- I believe the Court also -- Court's tentative also makes this legal error, is that reasonableness is distinct inquiry from necessity. Plaintiffs make the argument in their brief that a reasonable modification is just one that is

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18 necessary to provide meaningful access. But as the Ninth

19 Circuit has explained in cases like Fortune, Bowman, and

20 Lentini, and Bowman and Lentini are cited in Your Honor's

21 tentative, those are distinct inquiries.

Now Plaintiffs may have presented, and I know Your Honor highlights a piece of evidence about Ms. Wright, about whether it is necessary for her to be near the campus in order to access her benefits, but evidence regarding whether it is

necessary for one individual to be near the campus to access her benefits says nothing about whether or not requiring VA to install nearly 3,000 more permanent supportive housing units on the campus is a reasonable modification here.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence. They've raised no genuine issue of material fact on that issue. That failure should be dispositive of Defendant's motion under basic summary judgment principles.

As the Supreme Court explains in <u>Celotex</u>, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

That's the exact situation we have here. Plaintiffs have not raised a genuine dispute on that issue. Plaintiffs' failure to marshal any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact in opposing Defendant's motion should be dispositive.

Now even if we were to assume for argument's sake that Plaintiffs made the showing that was required of them, that would still leave Defendants' affirmative defenses. A defendant, and again stepping back to the section -- just basic Section 504 principles, a defendant can definitively rebut a plaintiff's initial showing that a modification is reasonable

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by demonstrating either that the modification would require a substantial alteration, the modification would require a fundamental alteration of a program or activity, or that the modification would impose an undue burden. If a defendant can make that showing, then the request of modification is, as a matter of law, not reasonable.

Here, in support of Defendant's motion, we have developed what I believe is a considerable record in support of our substantial alteration defense, our fundamental alteration defense, and our undue burden defenses. But I think there's an important point that the Court's tentative does not take account of, and that is in opposing Defendant's motion, Plaintiffs never actually addressed Defendant's substantial alteration argument or undue burden arguments. They never addressed the merits of those. They never highlighted any genuine issue of disputed fact on those defenses. I don't see where they ever actually make an argument against the substance of those arguments. I don't see where they ever acknowledge the legal standard of a substantial modification.

And for that standard, I'd point the Court to the footnote cited in our brief in Choate that explains the distinction between a fundamental alteration defense and a substantial alteration defense.

Now, the ordinary rule it seems in this district is that arguments that a party fails to meaningfully contest in

- 1 | this optimization brief are considered conceded. This Court
- 2 has applied that principle and has done so against Defendants
- 3 in this case.
- 4 While it might be a regrettable result for
- 5 Plaintiffs, there's no apparent reason why that principle
- 6 | should not govern here, particularly where Plaintiffs had a
- 7 | full and fair opportunity to oppose these arguments. But of
- 8 course, we don't need to hang our hat on any concession because
- 9 the undisputed facts before the Court more than support
- 10 Defendant's affirmative defenses.
- 11 And I think we just need to look at the
- 12 | campus. Plaintiffs are demanding, like I said, a three-fold
- 13 | increase in the number of permanent supportive housing units
- 14 | that VA currently has planned for development on the campus,
- 15 that VA has determined through its master planning process, is
- 16 | the appropriate amount to plan for development at this juncture
- 17 | subject to future reassessment.
- 18 Now, we think that's a substantial alteration, a
- 19 | substantial adjustment, substantial change, however you want to
- 20 | frame it, of VA's comprehensive plan for the campus. And as
- 21 Plaintiffs' own proffered expert has concluded, radical changes
- 22 to the campus would need -- would be necessary to execute their
- 23 proposed plan. And we absolutely agree.
- Now Your Honor, your tentative does not address the
- 25 | substantial modification standard. And again, like I said, the

- Supreme Court in Choate explained that, and as well as in Davis, explained that there is a distinction between a fundamental alteration defense and a substantial alteration
- 4 defense.

And on the unrebutted evidence in the record, I'm not sure how requiring VA to essentially scrap its comprehensive plan and create a new one that would be able to support 4,000 permanent supportive housing units on the campus is not a substantial alteration of that plan and of that activity.

And we think that the fact that there is -- that

Plaintiffs have raised no genuine dispute of fact on that issue

and their own proffered expert seems to agree with us, should

be again dispositive of Defendant's motion for summary

judgment.

Finally, on the meaningful access claim, I'd like to just briefly address our undue burden argument. As we explained in our briefing, Plaintiffs request for modification would impose really a panoply of administrative logistical and financial burdens that when taken cumulatively we believe cannot be justified under a Section 504 disparate impact claim.

Nowhere in their briefing do they ever mention a single one of those arguments it seems. And they don't raise a genuine issue of material fact on it, but it is worth -- I think it's worth here highlighting a few issues with respect to undue burden.

The first is that Plaintiffs requested housing before it could ever -- before it could ever begin development, VA would need to surmount several onerous regulatory hurdles and Your Honor highlights a couple of those in the tentative.

The unrebutted evidence shows that NEPA would require VA to complete an EIS to evaluate the environmental impacts of developing thousands of additional permanent supportive housing units on the campus, including expansion of infrastructure expansion of the utility systems.

Now that is -- comes from a declaration from the executive director for the Office of Asset Enterprise

Management, who oversees the full portfolio -- VA's real -- full real estate portfolio, property portfolio, including the EUL program.

According to that official, that EIS process that would be required by Plaintiff's request of modification would likely take more than three-and-a-half years to complete. That's unrebutted. Plaintiffs present no evidence to create a genuine issue of dispute on that fact.

And it would take more than three-and-a-half years to complete, given the complexities and impacts of developing substantially more housing on this campus, in addition to what is already ongoing, the development plans that are already ongoing.

Now, I'm not an environmental lawyer, but what I do

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consequence?

know about NEPA is that VA would need to take into consideration the cumulative impacts of past projects, current projects, and reasonably foreseeable future projects on this campus. Again, that regulatory hurdle would be an extreme time-consuming process. And if Plaintiffs -- what Plaintiffs are requesting is that these 4,000 units are ready to go in six years, that just cuts off at least three-and-a-half years of that timeline. Now, in addition to NEPA, Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act would require VA to complete historic preservation consultations for Plaintiff's proposed undertaking with the state historic preservation officer and other stakeholders. Those consultations would either address the entire proposed undertaking as a whole, or on an action-byaction basis. That's per -- for every demolition, for every site alteration, for every new construction, and they would do so under a programmatic agreement. And then they would need to obtain agreement from the state historic preservation officer before moving forward with any of those actions. Now, given the fact that installing nearly 3,000 more permanent supportive housing units on this campus, in addition to what is already planned --THE COURT: Why is the state preservation of

Isn't this federal property?

1 THE COURT: Okay, just take your time. I want to 2 hear that before anything else. I want to look at it.

In other words, I want to know what the authority of the state is, if it's input, you know, consultation, or if there's mandated federal regulations that say shall or must. I want you to pull this up for me in a minute.

MR. KNAPP: Your Honor, I believe it is 36 CFR 800.3.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KNAPP: It's going to be in 36 CFR 800.

THE COURT: Folks, come on up. If you're helping him, don't be shy about that. Come on up and take just a moment, counsel. They're doing a lot of work for you right now. It's appreciated.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I'm going to read to you, counsel, for just a moment. And I'm reading from 800.3(b). Coordinate with other reviews. "The agency official should coordinate the steps of the Section 106 process as appropriate with the overall planning schedule for the undertaking and with any reviews required under other authorities, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, and agency-specific legislation, such as Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.

control.

"We're consistent with the procedures in this subpart. The agency official may use information developed for other reviews under federal, state, or tribal law to meet the requirements of Section 106."

Now, I haven't researched that thoroughly, but I would read that as the federal entity needs to at least consult. They're at the table with the state preservation, but they're not mandated. In other words, it's simply input.

So take your time with that, and I'll research it further if this is -- now we can look at the Transportation Act and each of these acts independently. There may be mandatory language such as shall or must, but right now, it seems to be what I call a comity. In a sense, just -- let's consult, let's

And we're going to pull up the National Environmental Policy Act right now as well, counsel. I could be wrong, but we don't see any mandatory language yet, counsel.

get input from the state, but we -- federal agencies still

MR. KNAPP: Your Honor, my understanding -- now, you asked first for --

THE COURT: It's as simple as this. Can the state entity -- the state preservation entity, although they're invited to the table, quash the federal government agency and we don't see any mandatory language. We see them being consulted, it's a courtesy, it's a comity, we want their input,

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1 but federal plan, federal property, federal controls.
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2 MR. KNAPP: Let me answer that directly. My

3 understanding is no, a state historic preservation officer

4 | cannot -- he's not the final word, is my understanding of how

the regulation works.

6 THE COURT: No, it's not the final word. They can't

7 | stop it. I want to make it really simple.

In other words, if the federal government says X with federal land, I don't see anything in 106 that says that

there's any authority for the state entity to stop this

11 process.

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12 MR. KNAPP: They -- my understanding is that they do
13 not have the authority to stop it in its tracks. However,

14 there is some nuance here, because --

15 **THE COURT:** Show me where that is in the statute.

MR. KNAPP: Sure. So well --

17 **THE COURT:** No, no just -- just show me where that is

18 in the statute.

MR. KNAPP: Well, then --

for is the relationship between the entities, and right now if I was writing the opinion, without doing more research, I would

THE COURT: The word must or shall, all I'm looking

23 write that this is an act of comity between the federal

government that absolutely controls, getting input from the

25 state, but the state has no ability to countermand the decision

of the federal government.

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2 MR. KNAPP: Again, that's my --

3 **THE COURT:** And show --

4 MR. KNAPP: -- understanding of how the regulations

5 | work. The nuance that I just want to provide is that in 36 CFR

6 800.7, that does outline that if the State Historic

7 Preservation Office and the federal agency cannot reach an

8 agreement, that there are formal comment procedures for a

9 | federal advisory council. However, a federal agency, I don't

10 believe, has to go through that process.

A federal agency very well may respect the determination of a state historic preservation officer and not proceed any further. That is, my understanding, is the federal agency's prerogative, and that's the nuance that I wanted to provide. I can't say I'm not going to get in front of the VA and say what they would do in that hypothetical scenario.

However, the point that I think this Court can rely on is that this is a process that VA would need to proceed through. That is the requirement, is that the state historic preservation officer gets say in this process. And given the fact that on this historic district listed in the National Register, given the fact that, and this is unrebutted testimony, demolitions and significant site alterations would be necessary to incorporate thousands of additional permit supportive housing units on the campus, these consultations

will be challenging. Far more challenging than the consultations that have occurred to date.

And in order to reach agreement with the state historic preservation officer, they would have to have on the table the likely outcome of demolishing significant structures on this historic campus. Any mitigation measures that would be necessary, assuming the state historic preservation officer does, in fact, give the go-ahead on demolitions, would be far more costly.

And I think a very important point here is that demolitions and significant site alterations could irrevocably damage the campus' historic nature and potentially lead to it being delisted. That is in the PEIS, we cited in our brief, it's unrebutted by Plaintiffs. And in the Supreme Court case Tennessee v. Lane, which again we cited in our brief, the Supreme Court stated very clearly, an entity need not take measures that would threaten historic -- this is not a direct quote, but this is a principle. An entity need not take measures that would threaten historic preservation interests to comply with the statute's reasonable modifications requirement.

And if the Court wants more context on the implications of demolition and site alterations, I'd point the Court to the PEIS Section 4.3, which gives some context to that issue.

Now, just the last point on undue burden that I'd just like to emphasize is, regulatory burdens aside, I think it's worth discussing the impacts that the construction on the campus is currently having and how increased construction to accommodate Plaintiffs' demand for housing would exacerbate those issues.

The unrebutted evidence shows the campus currently is experiencing a host of construction-related challenges. Those are construction noise, utility shutdowns, road closures, project delays, and just general congestion. Those things disrupt campus life for veteran residents, and they disrupt operations, including the provision of important services to veterans.

Again, unrebutted testimony says that veteran residents have regularly voiced concerns at community meetings about how construction impacts their daily lives, noting the challenges of transitioning out of homelessness and into living in a heavy construction zone.

Now, it's just common sense that adding more active construction projects to that campus to try to meet a six-year timeline, and again, three-and-a-half years, this is unrebutted, three-and-a-half years would be knocked out of that timeline because of what -- at least three-and-a-half years because of what NEPA requires.

So to jam a bunch of active construction projects

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onto this campus would exacerbate those issues for veteran
residents, for veteran patients, for staff, and the provision
of health care to veterans on that campus.
          That's set out in the Declaration of Brett Simms.
                                                             We
see no evidence presented by Plaintiffs that that would not
occur. And so to avoid that result, given the number of
housing and other construction projects already in the hopper,
it would likely take more than seven years before the campus
can accommodate new unplanned projects without having even more
deleterious effects on campus life and campus operations.
          THE COURT:
                     That seven years that you just mentioned,
is that the date where the construction would cease and the
buildings would exist, or is that seven years, as you
mentioned, just the beginning of the process?
          MR. KNAPP: That seven years is before the campus
could initiate new unplanned projects without having --
          THE COURT:
                     Make it simple. What does that mean?
          MR. KNAPP:
                     There are considerable housing projects
and other construction projects already planned for the campus
into the future.
          THE COURT:
                     Okay.
          MR. KNAPP: A lot of those are permanent supportive
housing. We also have, I believe, initiating -- it's going to
be initiated or commencing in 2025, the building of a new
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critical care tower, a new hospital.

1 THE COURT: So in seven years, what would be 2 completed? MR. KNAPP: Well, I'm not sure what exactly would be 3 completed. All this statement is, and all this determination 4 5 is, is that before the initiation of new construction projects could start to be planned or initiated, it would be seven years 6 7 before they could do that without having even more adverse 8 effects on the campus. That is the --9 THE COURT: Okay. Let me repeat that back to you 10 because I'm not absorbing it, and that's my fault, not yours. 11 Are you saying that there would be a seven-year lag 12 before some amount of substantial construction started, and if 13 so, what would occur in that seven-year period of time? What 14 would be constructed, and what would occur at the seven-year 15 period? What I don't understand is what the plan is. 16 And I understand the argument, look, Judge, we've 17 got -- if you speed this up, it's going to be difficult for 18 veterans who are living there. There's substantial 19 construction going on. 20 My question back to you is, I don't understand the 21 timeline when you mentioned seven years. I don't know what 22 that means. 23 MR. LOWENSTEIN: Let me do my best to try to explain 24 what that tries to capture. 25 Right now, VA has a multitude of construction

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    projects --
              THE COURT:
                         Right.
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              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- currently on the campus --
              THE COURT:
 4
                          Right.
 5
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- planned and planned for the
    future. Many of those are permanent supportive housing
 6
 7
    construction projects. Those are on the hopper. Those are
 8
    going to proceed over the next several years.
 9
              VA also has --
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              THE COURT: Well, you are here over initially I think
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    your initial bargain or agreement was 1200 units; was that
12
    correct? The 2015 settlement, about 1200 units.
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              MR. SPEAKER: Yes.
14
              THE COURT: Would those 1200 units be completed by
15
    what date?
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              MR. LOWENSTEIN: My understanding is that they're on
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    schedule to be complete by 2030.
18
              THE COURT: Okay, by 2030. So is the argument then
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    that if there was eventually a verdict in favor of the
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    Plaintiffs, and the Court then set forth injunctive relief of
21
    some type, that if that timeline was disturbed, your argument
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    would be today that any additional units above 1200 units
2.3
    shouldn't start before 2030?
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              MR. LOWENSTEIN: (No audible response.)
25
              THE COURT:
                           In other words, up to 2030 we're going to
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    complete 1200 units and, Judge, anything above that would have
 2
    the same argument that you just proposed, and that is a
 3
    substantial disruption to the veterans living there,
    construction, increased traffic, etcetera.
 4
 5
              So if we had 50 more units or a thousand more units,
    Judge, your injunctive relief shouldn't --
 6
 7
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, --
              THE COURT: -- set forth anything before 2030.
 9
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- I think it is on a spectrum,
10
    right. The more units that would need to be constructed over
11
    Plaintiffs' proposed six-year period, the more adverse --
12
              THE COURT:
                          Sure.
13
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- impacts of the cumulative effects
14
    of many active construction projects on this campus --
15
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
16
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- in addition to construction of a
17
    new critical care tower unit --
18
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
19
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- on the south campus.
20
              THE COURT: Next question then is, the argument that
21
    historical preservation is important, I agree with that.
22
              But will historical preservation stop the ability of
2.3
    the VA to increase housing?
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              Let me give you this example. I have a building,
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it's designated historical but it's not habitable. And so does

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    that building then have historic preservation that outweighs
 2
    the need for habitability and the end result is that building
    remains vacant and we can't demolish it because if we demolish
 3
 4
    it, it's taking areas that we need?
 5
              And so what I'm driving at, the argument could be
    that historical preservation is getting in the way of housing
 6
 7
    veterans and the building remains vacant.
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, those assessments of --
 8
 9
    you know, I really can't do that assessment myself. I --
10
              THE COURT: I can't either.
11
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- can't do it in a --
12
              THE COURT:
                          That's why -- I don't know the answer.
13
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: I can't do it in a hypothetical.
14
    However, our point is principally when a --
15
              THE COURT: How many historical buildings are out
16
    there?
17
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: I'm not sure about how many because
18
    there is a --
19
              THE COURT: Well go over and ask. You're -- come on
20
    up here from -- folks. Now, about how many historical
21
    buildings are out there? Come on up. Just go over and talk.
22
              In other words, if historical preservation is going
23
    to hold up 70 buildings being rehabbed and they remain vacant,
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    then tough choice has to be made.
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They're either going to be historically preserved

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100 with no habitability or they're going to be rehabbed as historical buildings, or they're going to be demolished. And I'm not holding you folks to an absolute number. I'm just trying to get an idea. I don't know. Versus you've got a historical church out there, that thing looks horrible, for both of you, you ought to get together and immediately resolve to pain the church, okay? I can bet you there's a number of veterans out there that will paint it for you. MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, after consulting with my knowledgeable colleague, --THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you, knowledgeable colleague, okay, appreciate it. MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- our understanding is that there are two historic buildings that are actually listed on the National Register. Okav. THE COURT: MR. LOWENSTEIN: However, because this is a historic district, the entire historic district is what -- well, the whole north campus and part of the northwest section of the --**THE COURT:** And who eventually decides that? other words, does the VA take this to Congress, does -- how do we decide in a historic district what's really going to be preserved and what's not?

And how does that affect the ability to get veterans

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    each other, helping --
 2
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: We know the State --
              THE COURT: -- end each other.
 3
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- Historic Preservation Officer has
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 5
    a seat at that table.
 6
              THE COURT: Okay.
 7
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: We know that tribes are invited to
    that table.
 8
 9
              THE COURT:
                          Sure.
10
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: In this process -- or let me step
11
    back --
12
              THE COURT: Probably transportation because it's one
13
    of the -- they mention Section 4.
14
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: Sure. In prior historic
15
    preservation consultations regarding what was occurring on the
16
    campus, other community entities were involved --
17
              THE COURT: And has that occurred thus far?
                                                            Has
18
    there been such a meeting or effort to sort out this argument
19
    about preservation, which is important, versus getting veterans
20
    into either preserved, habitable buildings, or the tough call
21
    about whether they're going to be demolished?
22
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: I have two answers for you.
23
              With respect to the current plan, the current number
24
    of --
25
              THE COURT:
                           No, no, that's not my question.
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              MR. LOWENSTEIN:
                              Okav.
 2
              THE COURT:
                         -- don't -- I'm not interested in plans.
 3
    I'm not interested -- I'm interested has any action of this
 4
    kind taken place? If so, when was this request made? When do
 5
    they meet? Who are they?
 6
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: So my understanding of what occurred
 7
    in the past is that the State Historic Preservation Officer and
 8
    the VA, in consultation with other stakeholders, entered into
 9
    what is known as a programmatic agreement.
10
              THE COURT:
                          When?
11
              MR. LOWENSTEIN:
                               That programmatic --
12
              THE COURT:
                          When?
13
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: I do not have the exact date for
14
    you, Your Honor. Would you like me to get it?
15
                          No. They're right by -- folks, come on
              THE COURT:
16
         Just want to hear this process. And you two have been at
17
    it in litigation since 2012. I'd just like to hear the reality
18
    of what's occurred in this period of time.
19
              If this preservation act is important, which we all
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    agree it is, if that's bumping up against the ability of
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    veterans to get housed, and if it is, if we're rehabbing these
22
    preserved buildings or, if the tough call is made that we have
2.3
    to demolish some of them.
24
         (Judge/Clerk confer.)
25
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
                                 Now just a moment.
                                                      In May, 2019
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forget the building, two off to the side, but that -- those

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    buildings had to go through the process. That's where we have
 2
    some of the 223 veterans that are housed --
 3
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's my understanding those --
              THE COURT: -- as you go up -- right here.
 4
 5
              So they've gone through that process, and they've
    decided to preserve those buildings, they've rehabbed them,
 6
 7
    they haven't demolished them.
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: That's correct.
 8
 9
              THE COURT: Now, if they can do that with those
10
    buildings, the argument is, Judge, preservation may get in the
11
    way, why can't we do those with the rest of the buildings?
12
              Or if there's something that's just rat-infested,
13
    walls are falling down, you know, then we tear it down.
14
              And I don't know where we're at in this process when
15
    you argue preservation, which we all agree to, versus
16
    preservation getting in the way of habitability and moving
17
    veterans in.
18
              MR. LOWENSTEIN: Your Honor, a number -- my
19
    understanding is, is that a number of buildings will be
20
    renovated through that process. However, --
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              THE COURT:
                          Which --
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              MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- the question is, is are there
23
    enough buildings on that campus to house a total of 4,000 --
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              THE COURT:
                          Right.
25
              MR. LOWENSTEIN:
                               -- permanent supportive housing
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units on a historic district that if you were to build a tenstory tall building, how would that impact the historic preservation or the historic equalities of that campus? Would that lead to delisting of that district from the National Register? So I'm not going to get ahead of the agency and try to do that assessment in my head on building by building. However, it's the process that needs to occur, --THE COURT: Okay. MR. LOWENSTEIN: -- the process that needs to go through. And the unrebutted evidence says that there would need to be demolitions to make that room, and significant site alterations. And those could potentially impact the historic fabric of that district. THE COURT: So there are two individually listed National Register properties, the Wadsworth Chapel, which I've been referring to, and the street car people. That doesn't mention any of the other buildings. MR. LOWENSTEIN: If I may, because it's a historic district, there are, my understanding, nearly 50 contributing buildings. They not -- may not be individually listed on the National Register but those nearly 50 buildings contribute to the historic nature of the district itself.

There are also I believe nearly 20 historic

(Pause)

1 | Court reached at the motion to dismiss stage.

You know, we respect the conclusions that Your Honor has reached, but we think that they're deeply wrong.

I'll point out that the focus of the Court's analysis should be on statutory language. I think that the existence of this 1888 deed and the sort of original purposes for which the land was donated to the National Home for Disabled Volunteer -- Volunteer Disabled Soldiers has motivated a lot of the thinking around this issue.

But the focus, because we're talking about a federal entity that is bound to act within statutory bounds, the focus of the analysis should be on statutory language.

And, you know, Plaintiffs state that the <u>West Los</u>

<u>Angeles Leasing Act</u> and its subsequent amendments provide that language, provide language that gives rise to fiduciary duties above and beyond the language of those statutes. And I just don't think that that's a plausible reading of the <u>West Los</u>

<u>Angeles Leasing Act</u>.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KNAPP: That is a very narrow provision that governs how VA can lease the property out to third parties. It doesn't include any mandatory language about constructing housing.

And their best case -- and this goes back to the Valentini litigation, so Valentini agreed with us on this point

at the motion to dismiss stage, said there's no statute that 1 2 gives rise to the sorts of fiduciary duties that the plaintiffs in that case with the same counsel here were advocating for. 3 They -- and that court said, and Plaintiffs have 4 5 cited it again in this case, said that Fitzgerald versus Baxter 6 State Park Authority, Maine Supreme Court case, was the most 7 analogous setting to what was going on here. And the court said in Valentini, there's no statutory 9 language anything like what existed in Fitgerald v. Baxter. 10 Plaintiffs have come in in this case, and they say 11 the West Los Angeles Leasing Act fills that gap. But now we 12 are in a different situation. 13 I'll just encourage the Court to look at the 14 underlying statutes that were at issue in Fitzgerald. 15 look nothing like the West Los Angeles Leasing Act. I'll read 16 you some of the language. 17 In 12, this is the main revised statutes, Title 12, 18 Section 900 states, in statutory language, seldom has a more 19 generous gift been presented to a people than has been given by 20 Percival Proctor Baxter to the people of the State of Maine. 21 It is incumbent upon them, the recipients, to 22 preserve the trust impressed upon them, to ensure for 23 themselves and for future generations the fullest use of the 24 Baxter State Park --

Just a little slower so we pick that up.

- Read that last portion again. I'm not sure we got it on CourtSmart.
- MR. KNAPP: It is incumbent upon them, the
 recipients, to preserve the trust impressed upon them, to
 ensure for themselves and for future generations the fullest
 use of Baxter State Park, consistent with the desires of the
 donor. That's Section 900.

Section 901 states, the authority is authorized to expend such sums so received for such purposes, and shall hold and use such lands as specified in the trust.

Section 906 says nothing in Section 900 or any other law shall be interpreted or construed to modify, nullify, or affect in any way any of the provisions in any deed of trust made by Percival Proctor Baxter conveying land in Baxter State Park to the State of Maine.

Nothing in the <u>West Los Angeles Leasing Act</u> cross-references the original donation of this land to the national home. Nothing in it purports to incorporate those original purposes.

The <u>West Los Angeles Leasing Act</u> is a relatively routine statute governing how an agency can use the land that has been assigned to it by Congress.

I'll point out that -- and this is something

Plaintiffs never engaged with, and I don't see it in Your

Honor's order. And I apologize if I might have missed it.

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But they never grapple with Congress's elimination of the national home. And in Section 38 USC, Section 8113, with the fact that Congress expressly provided that any incumbrance on national home property would be extinguished so as to ensure that the United States had full use of the property, unencumbered by any prior deeds or things like a trust. And so we would encourage Your Honor to go back to those sources because we think that they really -- that's where the -- your -- the Court's attention should be focused, is on whether the West Los Angeles Leasing Act provides for the assumption of duties under a trust. And it just doesn't do so. Even if we do focus on the deed, though, I think it's important to put that deed in context because it doesn't do the work that Plaintiffs would have it do and that the Court's tentative order purports to have it do. The language in that deed which speaks of permanent maintenance of a branch home of the National Home For Disabled Volunteer Soldiers simply parrots the statute that authorized the establishment of the Pacific branch. We've cited to Your Honor a 1915 California Supreme Court case, Victoria Hospital Association, --THE COURT: Right. MR. KNAPP: -- that stands for the proposition that when a deed -- a purported deed of trust simply parrots the

purposes for which the charitable organization the land is

being donated to, simply parrots the charitable purposes of the
organization, that doesn't give rise to trust obligations.

And we think that's true here. All -- the purpose was for the national home to use the property for the purposes that the national home was established for.

Congress later got rid of the national home. Without a national home, those purposes no longer existed.

At bottom, and this gets to a reason why I do think this deserves some reconsideration by the Court, is I think this creates some problems for us as we move ahead to trial.

I don't see any daylight between the APA claims, which are about compliance with the <u>West Los Angeles Leasing</u>

<u>Act</u>, and what should be any obligations under the trust to the extent that the trust is given life by the <u>West Los Angeles</u>

Leasing Act.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KNAPP: It seems like Plaintiffs would like to sort of use their trust claims as a backdoor to reestablish the national home that Congress disestablished.

That might be a good idea as a policy matter. But that's a judgment for Congress to make in statute, not Plaintiffs through novel theories of trust or this Court.

And if we're to go to trial about the terms of breach of the terms of any fiduciary duty that the VA owes under the 1888 deed, we should know exactly what those duties are and

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              MR. KNAPP: -- we'll have a second round, yeah.
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              THE COURT: It'll be much more brief.
              Then counsel on behalf of the Intervenors,
 3
    Bridgeland, do you have any arguments you'd like to make?
 4
 5
              MR. GUADIANA: No argument, Your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT: I didn't think it involved you but it
 7
    may. All right.
 8
              Then, counsel, I have a plea in a criminal matter at
    1:30, which was 15 minutes ago.
10
              Why don't you go out, get lunch, sort out your
11
    thoughts, come up with a suggested time of half an hour maybe
12
    on your rebuttal arguments, something like that. And why don't
    we meet in -- I'll just stay in session. What would be
13
14
    comfortable for you for lunch?
15
              MR. ROSENBAUM: May I ask Your Honor what about Your
16
    Honor having lunch or --
17
              THE COURT: No, I'm not going to have lunch. How
18
    about 2:15, 2:30?
19
              MR. ROSENBAUM: You tell us. Either one's fine with
20
    us.
21
              MR. KNAPP:
                          Yeah. We're happy to come back whenever.
22
              THE COURT: Well, between 2:15 and 2:30. When you
23
    folks appear we should be done with that criminal matter. I'll
24
    just stay in session, okay?
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         (Court takes up other matters from 1:44 p.m. to 2:24 p.m.)
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THE COURT: Then we're back on the record. All counsel are present. And, counsel, the concluding argument on behalf of the Plaintiffs. MR. ROSENBAUM: Good afternoon again, Your Honor. THE COURT: Afternoon. MR. ROSENBAUM: I want to focus and turn us to the facial discrimination issue that we had dialogue about this morning, and respond specifically to counsel's discussion of that issue. The -- what I found most significant about that argument was the manner by which it supported all the points that you and I discussed. Let me start out with acknowledgement that after listening to counsel and reviewing their papers again, there isn't any dispute, there isn't any factual dispute about the policy that we are asserting facially discriminates in violation of Section 504. And that is that the VA and HUD, but the VA in particular, is sanctioning the use of income limitations and

And that is that the VA and HUD, but the VA in particular, is sanctioning the use of income limitations and within those income limitations, disability compensation, counting it as income, for purposes of eligibility for permanent supportive housing.

I want to correct one thing counsel actually began his argument with because I think it's important for several reasons.

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1 This is all about healthcare. The housing, as Your Honor's articulated in the order denying the motion to dismiss, 3 is a means for reasonable access to get to that healthcare. And that's what we're talking about, and that's what the stakes 5 are. And maybe somewhat as a side matter counsel began his 7 argument by pointing out that one of our Plaintiffs is in 8 building 208. I don't think he said 208 but it is. Exactly right. 10 And the reason is, Your Honor, because they raised the AMI limit so that the disability compensation would not 11 disqualify the eligibility. 12 13 Prior to that the individual was not eligible for 14 that permanent supportive housing. And it was only with that 15 action that the individual got in. 16 The newest building that is about to be completed or 17 supposed to be completed is one that will have 70 apartments on 18 the property. And it has a 50 percent AMI. And we have --19 THE COURT: Is that 207? 20 MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't think it has a number yet, 21 Your Honor. It's run by New Directions. 22 THE COURT: If you look at the quad, one's completed 23 here, the one you look straight in, and then the -- to the 24 left, that building was --MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I just consult --

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1	THE COURT: Yeah.
2	MR. ROSENBAUM: with Mr. Reynolds?
3	THE COURT: I think that's is it 211
4	MR. ROSENBAUM: Four, zero, one.
5	THE COURT: What is it, 401?
6	MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, sir, yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Where is that located?
8	MR. ROSENBAUM: It's near McArthur Field.
9	THE COURT: Okay. So it's not part of the complex of
10	the three.
11	MR. ROSENBAUM: Exactly right. I can
12	THE COURT: All right.
13	MR. ROSENBAUM: show it to you on a map but, yeah.
14	THE COURT: Okay. And what building's that?
15	MR. ROSENBAUM: And that has a 50 percent AMI
16	THE COURT: And that's building 401.
17	MR. ROSENBAUM: Correct.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. ROSENBAUM: And it includes disability as part of
20	income. And we have been working with an individual,
21	Mr. Reynolds in particular,
22	THE COURT: Who?
23	MR. ROSENBAUM: Mr. Reynolds, who is one
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	MR. ROSENBAUM: of our witnesses, who was blown up

You've got developer one and developer

THE COURT:

- 1 what we are attacking here is the usage to any degree of
- 2 disability compensation as income.
- 3 **THE COURT:** I understand that.
- 4 MR. ROSENBAUM: If Your Honor's asking, you know, do
- 5 those numbers vary depending on it, yes.
- 6 THE COURT: That's what I'm asking.
- 7 MR. ROSENBAUM: But the statutory problem here, the
- 8 final four problem here, the facial discrimination problem here
- 9 is that wherever that is set, there are going to be veterans
- 10 with disability compensation who aren't going to be eligible.
- 11 And that is the problem here.
- Now, Townsend, which they did not answer, Townsend is
- 13 directly on point. And I want to -- so let me just say I was
- 14 looking at page 20 of their brief. They say that there is no
- 15 | facial discriminatory policy. I just told Your Honor what it
- 16 lis.
- 17 Then they go to *Townsend*. I'm so glad that they
- 18 raised it in the way that they did because it amplifies our
- 19 point.
- In *Townsend*, the problem was all about income.
- 21 | That's why Mr. Townsend didn't get it, didn't get the
- 22 | categorically needed category of assistance, medical assistance
- 23 that he desperately wanted in order to avoid segregation under
- 24 the meaning of 504.
- 25 The court said, Washington's law explicitly providing

1 only nursing-based home-based long-term care services to the 2 medically needy -- that's where he ended up because of the income increase, \$46 -- may be read to facially discriminate 3 against disabled persons because of those who need the kind of 4 5 long-term assistance at issue that is assistance in performing 6 essential life activities are disabled within the meaning of 7 the ADA. And I'll be honest with Your Honor, this did not 9 really occur to me until I was listening to the argument. 10 THE COURT: Say that again. 11 What I'm about to tell you, I MR. ROSENBAUM: 12 apologize, did not occur to me until the argument, until Your 13 Honor pointed some things out with the questions and, quite 14 frankly, until counsel made some concessions which were 15 undisputed as a matter of fact. 16 Mr. Townsend, as Judge Birdsong pointed out, was

Mr. Townsend, as Judge Birdsong pointed out, was disabled before he got reclassified, and he was disabled afterwards. And that's the basis on which the court says this is facial discrimination. It nails the disabled individual, Mr. Townsend.

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We have double the problem because our veterans are disabled before and after these income limitations that include disability compensation.

In both cases, what's keeping them from the permanent supportive housing to which they are legally entitled is

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What makes our case statutorily more toxic is that
the problem is multiplied because it is disability compensation
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4 that is pushing our individuals over the limits.

income. And that's Townsend.

That's why when I answered Your Honor's question, that's why I said, you know, wherever it is, there's some veteran, way too many, some veteran who's getting pushed over.

And that's where Lovell (phonetic) controls --

THE COURT: Who has the authority to raise the limitation of that individual versus the gentleman you mentioned who got into building 401? Who has that; the VA, the Congress, who makes that decision?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Great question. The problem is that the VA, by outsourcing the construction of the provision of permanent supportive housing and saying to developers, you're on your own, go find your income stream, go find your way of getting tax credits, opens the door to discrimination.

THE COURT: Well, just a moment. I'm -- I don't know so I'm going to ask again. My fault. I didn't understand.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I'm probably not explaining it right.
I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No, it's me. It's not you.

I think you mentioned the gentleman's name and it went by me, Mr. Wright. I'm not sure. Who went into building 401, which of your clients?

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124
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              Johnson.
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              THE COURT: Okay, Johnson. And you argued in your
    papers and you argued today that there was a raise in the
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    limitation so this individual could get in. And I forget if it
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    was 80 percent or 50 percent.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              Yeah.
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              THE COURT: It doesn't matter now. I'll go back and
 8
    look at your documents.
 9
              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              Yeah.
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              THE COURT:
                         Who --
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Go, I'm listening.
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              THE COURT: -- had the authority to raise that
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    limitation?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: HUD.
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              THE COURT: Who?
16
              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                             HUD.
17
              THE COURT:
                          Who? I'm just kidding you. I got it,
18
    HUD. Now where's HUD? Who represents HUD? Okay.
19
         (Laughter)
20
              He's smiling over there.
21
              So not the VA.
22
              MR. ROSENBAUM: I'm guessing there was -- you know,
23
    they didn't just -- I -- it wasn't a surprise. They knew they
24
    had a problem in this case. And but, yes, it was HUD.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay, HUD. Because in the original
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documents for both -- on the motion to dismiss, there was an
argument that somewhat crossed about HUD's responsibility and
the VA's responsibility.
         MR. ROSENBAUM:
                         Yeah.
          THE COURT: And I struggled with that for a while.
         And when HUD does this, what's the developer's role,
if anything, other than tax credits? Does the developer have
any say in this?
         And, if so, in this system that I'm not quite certain
I yet fully understand, but I promise you I will, what role
does the developer play at that point?
         MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't know for sure.
          THE COURT: Fifty percent limitation we need to get
it to 80? What role does the developer play. Or is this
simply HUD making a recommendation?
         MR. ROSENBAUM: I think HUD says this is the way it
is, and the developer says, okay, I'm not going to get as much
as I thought, I can live with this. And the developer's
getting a lease.
          THE COURT: No, just a moment.
         MR. ROSENBAUM:
                         It's getting a lengthy lease.
          THE COURT: Now, HUD comes -- in your papers, the
inference that you draw or ask the Court to draw is, look, we
got a lawsuit, we've got one of our Plaintiffs here, HUD or VA
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from the Defendants' standpoint eradicates one of our
Plaintiffs because now they're in housing.

- All I care about right now is if HUD's making that decision, I don't understand at that point in time what the developer's position is because the developer still has some control.
- The developer's going to have to acquiesce to this

 one person or this one raised limitation coming in. And

 they're going to lose money on it. Strike that. They're not

 going to get as much money on it.

There's only two explanations for that.

- Speculatively, developer's not going to push HUD because there's a lot of people coming into the building and one doesn't matter.
 - And your argument would be, Judge, that shows that they're, you know, trying to take some of our Plaintiffs out because they've gotten housing, out of this lawsuit.
 - And I'm just wondering if you're right, why one and not all? In other words, if you go from 50 percent to 80 percent, then why aren't you going to 80 percent across the board, whether that's satisfactory to you or not as the Plaintiff?
 - One explanation could be because it lowers the income stream to the developer. Your explanation is going to be, well, no, they're singling out one of my Plaintiffs.

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              MR. ROSENBAUM: My explanation is going to be exactly
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    what Your Honor said, multiplied by the fact that the
    developer's still doing fine, it's just one individual in
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    there --
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              THE COURT:
                         Now what's the return if I move to --
              MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I just complete --
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 7
              THE COURT: No, no, just a moment.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              I'm sorry.
 9
              THE COURT:
                          If I don't know, I get to ask, and we've
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    got all day and all night, believe it or not. What I don't
11
    know, I just don't know.
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              Johnson moved to what, 80 percent?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Correct.
14
              THE COURT: What's the return?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Sixty percent.
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              THE COURT: Sixty, okay, just a moment. I wrote down
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    80. Sixty percent.
18
              What's the return to the developer between 50
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    percent -- was he 50 percent before?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Yeah.
21
                          Okay. What's the return on the developer
              THE COURT:
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    between 50 percent and 60 percent; how much did he lose, $20 a
23
    month, a hundred dollars a month?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't know. But --
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              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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128
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: -- if your point is --
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              THE COURT: No, no, hold on. You don't know what my
 3
    point is yet.
              If I took all the people going into building 401 and
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 5
    hypothetically I had 50 people going in there, let's make it
 6
    easy, a hundred people so we can do the math, and I move from
 7
    50 percent with whatever return I had as a developer to 60
 8
    percent, what's my profit margin on 60 percent?
 9
              MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I --
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              THE COURT: And what was my profit margin on 50
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    percent?
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I answer that? I don't know
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    what -- I don't have the numbers.
14
                          Okay.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. ROSENBAUM: But I'd like to be able to try to
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    answer the question for you.
17
              When I spoke to you this morning, I said that one way
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    besides building housing that the VA could take care of this --
19
    guys -- that the VA could take care of this is by subsidy.
20
              This isn't that much. They acknowledge that there --
21
    they -- their -- when I -- when Mr. Silberfeld deposed --
22
              THE COURT: Well that's -- you're heading -- for both
23
    of you, here's the crucial question. It may be a huge amount
24
    of money. It may be a de minimis amount of money.
25
              I just don't know what the return to the developer is
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- between going for 50 percent to 60 percent. In other words, it
 may be chump change, maybe nothing where you can move a hundred
 people in and raise the standard.
 - Now, that's never going to satisfy you because you'll always come back and argue, Judge, there's two percent or one percent or three percent left and, therefore, it's facially discrimination.
 - But by the same token, I'm just wondering what the dollars are to raise from 50 percent --
- MR. ROSENBAUM: No, but --

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- 11 **THE COURT:** -- to 60 percent or to even 80 percent.
- 12 I don't know what kind of money we're talking about.
- 13 MR. ROSENBAUM: But Your Honor raises another

 14 important point which I probably didn't stress sufficiently

 15 this morning, and that is HUD always has the capacity to waive

 16 any of these requirements. That's how the 80 percent got with

 17 the tenant based. So they always could do this.
 - But the underlying point -- I love Your Honor's point in terms of, you know, they'll do it for Johnson because makes the case a lot easier for them in their judgment.
 - But the point that I want to make to the Court is we're messing with a violation of the law. And it -- obviously we're grateful that Johnson is in the housing. I can't tell you how hard Mr. Reynolds worked on that.
- 25 But that doesn't cure the law because there's a

1 issue remains the same.

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- 2 THE COURT: I know.
- MR. ROSENBAUM: And Lovell says at 1053, it is 3 undisputed that disabled people who but for their disability 4 5 were eligible for healthcare benefits from the state under quest are now being categorically excluded.

7 And what I'm saying to Your Honor is that on the AMI issue, that is exactly what we have here, doubly, first by 8 putting them in a situation where disabled persons can't get 10 in --

THE COURT: But Defendants argued in their argument and said that you didn't address the -- and it was never addressed, this issue concerning a substantial burden if this modification was made.

And so I don't know what that means yet in terms of real practical terms.

MR. ROSENBAUM: But you don't get to that issue unless you determine that there's not facial discrimination.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSENBAUM: And that's -- you know, that's why I present it that way.

And if you look at pages, you know, 20 and 21 of their brief, they describe the issues as legal issues. If in fact we get into a reasonable modification, you know, we'll take that on.

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But in terms of facial discrimination, we don't get to that issue whatsoever.

And, as I said, they don't have a way around

Townsend. Our clients are far more discriminated against than

Townsend. Like I said, there's a double discrimination.

And they don't have an answer to Lovell and they don't have an answer to the basic Bart (phonetic) formulation of what facial discrimination is.

Facial discrimination means what? It means that when you look at the policy or the practice, you cannot change it, you cannot make a fundamental alteration without destroying what the nature of that statute or policy or practice is.

And they have not met their burden in terms of showing that this is not facial discrimination.

Now, I do want to say just a couple things. And the other thing that counsel did was that counsel conflated the project-based housing off the campus and the housing on the campus with the HUD VASH vouchers for tenant base. They conflated those.

And what counsel said is, give us a lot of credit, we raised it to 80 percent. And if you look at page 28, lines 21 and 22 of their brief, they say, we get 97 percent.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSENBAUM: And my point was, no, you can't do
that. You cannot say -- I don't care if its 99 percent, you

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- cannot take the most disabled individuals and keep them out,
 whether it's one percent, three percent, or 30 percent.

 And so with respect to the issue that they're
 - And so with respect to the issue that they're conflating here, the vouchers, on that their income, their AMI policy which includes disability compensation, they can't make it work because it has to be a hundred percent.
- 7 It couldn't be more on its face. It has to be a 8 hundred percent or it's in violation of 504.
 - Now I want to deviate from the facial discrimination argument just to answer some misconceptions that were presented to Your Honor this morning.
- If you look at their brief, their brief states that
 the reason we can't build is the West L-A-V-A Leasing Act. And
 that's just not true, Your Honor.
 - I read the statute to Your Honor this morning. I know Your Honor is super familiar with it. But there's no mandate there. There's no requirement. There's no must.
- There's no exclusivity with respect to the building of permanent supportive housing.
 - And as I also pointed out, if you look at the part two, (b)(2) I think it was, where they list all the purposes,
 "A" through "I," they're doing that ten ways to Sunday in terms of what's there.
- And if it were exclusive restriction under their
 theory of the statute, they couldn't do it. So then they shift

- ground and they say, we don't have the authority to build that housing.
- Did they point Your Honor to any statute that said it? No. There is no such statute. Did they present Your Honor any sort of statement from Congress they can't do it?

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No.

- In fact, Your Honor, if you look at 38 USC 8162 which deals with enhanced use leases, it says (a)(1) the secretary may, in accordance with the subchapter, enter into leases with respect to real property that is under the jurisdiction or control of the secretary.
 - Any such under -- any such lease under this lease may be referred to as an enhanced use lease.
 - The secretary may dispose of such property that is leased to another party under the subchapter. The secretary may exercise the authority.
- So the statute, the West L.A. leasing statute, puts no such restriction. Surely Congress knows how to do it.
- And the enhanced use lease statute is about things
 that the secretary may do.
 - But you would expect if their argument was correct, that it would say this is the only way it can get done. The secretary must use -- you asked me this morning, is this -- what's the story across the country.
- You would expect if this were the only route, it

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would say, for enhanced use leases, this is the only way the secretary can see that there is provision of permanent supportive housing, but the secretary may not build it, have to use the EULs. That isn't there. And then there is the other powerful point that counsel referred to. Counsel said, you know, there's a lot of construction going on there on the campus including, for example, the critical care center. Then -- and then he says, well, there's no authority on this. Well, there is no authority specifically stated to build a critical care center on the West LA campus. There is no explicit authority to buy a wheelchair. There's no explicit authority to build wheelchair ramps. What there is, is explicit authority to address mental health issues; all over the statutes. What there is, is authority from Congress to address health issues. That's why they can build the critical care. It's not illegal. Of course they can build it because that's how you deliver medical care. Of course you can pay for psychiatrists and therapists, because that's how you deal with mental health. And the budget, 369 billion, says explicitly, use the money for healthcare, use the money for mental healthcare. And then I read you bullet five of President Biden's

1 five was address homelessness.

2 And they have authority out the wazoo to address veteran homelessness.

And counsel is exactly wrong when he says this is about building housing. No. It's about providing access to medical care. And they have conceded that.

In fact, in deposition, when I asked Dr. Braverman about it, he said, yeah, you don't get housing, your healthcare is going to deteriorate. That's what the Cole Hayne (phonetic) deposition was about.

That's what the Kewn (phonetic) deposition was about. That's what the Dennis deposition was about. That's their housing first policy which they properly tout in terms of its principles.

The whole principle of permanent supportive housing isn't not -- it's not to build a second home in Palm Springs, it's to get veterans in a place where they can get healthcare. And there's plenty of authority.

Now, like I said, none of that goes to facial discrimination, the argument I made. But I just want to disabuse that they're going to be out to lunch if they can't do it. They have it.

They could also say if you're going to use an enhanced use lease and you're going to get state and local funding, they can't have disability restrictions. I read Your

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1
    Honor the 36 CFR Section 15.130(b)(3). What could be clearer?
 2
              The agency may not directly or through contractual or
    other arrangements use criteria or methods of administrations
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    the purpose or effect of which would subject qualified
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 5
    individuals with a handicap to discrimination on the basis of
 6
    the handicap or substantially impair the accomplishments or
 7
    objectives of a program with respect to individuals who have
 8
    handicaps.
              That's my point. You can't do this.
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              Do they have other methods? Under facial
    discrimination we don't even ask that question. But I'm saying
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    to Your Honor there's plenty.
13
              And their own regs -- they're basically saying, as I
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    started my argument, and I'll conclude it now, they're
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    basically saying this obscene contradiction that 504 means that
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    veterans should have permanent supportive housing so that they
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    can access healthcare, except we are going to sanction
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    requirements that discrimination in the form of use of
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    disability income be permitted to deny them that permanent
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    supportive housing.
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              It's one of the few times in life when there's really
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    a catch 22. But this is a catch that really, really
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    discriminates and denies these veterans what they have.
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              Indeed, Your Honor, if there is a -- if -- there are
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    multiple causes of veteran homelessness, but one of those
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- 140 causes should not be the VA's use of provisions in what they are telling their outsource developers they can accept that discriminates based on disability compensation. Townsend requires it, Lovell requires it, Bart requires it, Choat (phonetic) requires it when it talks about the basis. This is facial discrimination 101. THE COURT: Okay, counsel, thank you very much. Why don't you consult with your colleagues for just a moment? And then after you've concluded, I've got questions for both of you, and they'll be brief, though. Why don't you check with your colleagues? (Pause) MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I make two more brief points, Your Honor? THE COURT: Certainly. MR. ROSENBAUM: Again, I know Your Honor knows this. You've heard it ad nauseum from me. We don't look past the facial discrimination. But, in fact, when they talked about AMI in their papers, they don't raise undue burden. That isn't raised as a defense. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROSENBAUM: And the other argument is the 97
- 25 That's just with respect to the -- if there are other

percent as counsel reminds me, I'm being conservative.

The federal government is one of limited powers that are specified in either the Constitution or in statute or in some other basis of law.

THE COURT: That's going to be my question just a moment when you've concluded for both of you.

MR. KNAPP: And, you know, I can -- cases that I have litigated personally, most of my job is losing cases where an agency has done something and can't point to an express authorization in a statute for what it did.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. KNAPP: And so I'm just -- I will submit to the Court that what counsel has argued today flips on its head the way that this should work.

They should point to a statute that expressly authorizes the VA to directly construct housing; not the other way around.

I'll also note that Congress would probably be surprised to find that whenever it legislates the provision of mental health services and appropriates money for that purpose, that notwithstanding the existence of appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, all of that, that it's also created a housing program for everyone who receives those services.

Congress doesn't -- didn't legislate that way and would be surprised that it did here.

The funding that they're talking about as being available -- and I will be clear, I don't think that their analysis of the appropriations is actually accurate, the money is not available for those for the purpose of constructing housing directly by VA.

But that funding is a finite pool. It's not ever-expanding. And so to the extent that we're going to raid that piggybank to start building housing on the campus, it's to the detriment of the services that are being provided to veterans by doctors at the hospital, those mental health consultations. It's coming from that same pot of money.

I'll also note, you know, counsel addressed what I said earlier this morning, which is that I feel like there's a slippage in the service that they say they're being denied.

And he agreed with me that their claims have always been about access to medical services, to the mental health services that veterans are entitled to from the VA.

But they've not actually argued that they're denied any of those benefits based on their income. What they're saying is that the developers impose income-based limitations on access to housing.

That's access to the accommodation that they say is needed to get their services. It's not the service that they're seeking.

I'll also note counsel is very confused about the

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    role of the developers here. And that's just more evidence
    that -- of why this could go to trial and Your Honor could get
 3
    a full record as to what the relationship is and what the
 4
    responsibilities are of the developers in this setting.
 5
              HUD did not do anything to make Mr. Johnson eligible
    for that unit. That was based on the sorts of engagement that
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 7
    I described earlier today that VA has engaged in with its
 8
    developers to help them find ways around the income-based
 9
    limitations that they're subject to by their funders.
10
              That involves going back to the funders, getting
11
    their agreement with raising the limitations that they're
12
    subject to.
13
              That's not a decision by HUD, it's not a decision by
14
         It's a decision by all these third parties that are not in
15
    front of the Court.
16
              THE COURT: The developer?
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              MR. KNAPP:
                          Sorry?
18
              THE COURT:
                          The developer?
19
              MR. KNAPP:
                          Yes.
20
              Counsel is also confused about this three percent of
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    people who are excluded. Those are individuals who are going
22
    to have incomes about 70K, above the 80 percent AMI threshold
23
    for HUD VASH. Those are not people who are being excluded
24
    based on the amount of their disability --
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Okay.

THE COURT:

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              MR. KNAPP:
                         -- benefits. That amount is well beyond
 2
    anything that's paid out based on a service-connected
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    disability.
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              Your Honor asked a question about the impact of a
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    change at the high level, you know, if we were to not --
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              THE COURT: Yeah, 50, 60, 80 percent.
 7
              MR. KNAPP: Yeah. And I think Your Honor's question
 8
    was --
 9
              THE COURT: And the return.
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              MR. KNAPP: -- went to, you know, if we're excluding
11
    disability benefits from this calculation, what's the impact.
12
              I'm not sure what the impact is for the developers
13
    because I don't represent them and I haven't looked at their
14
    budgets, and I don't know exactly --
15
              THE COURT: Well, if we get to trial, --
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              MR. KNAPP: -- what their --
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              THE COURT: -- if the defense is undue burden,
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    etcetera, we're going to get into that area.
19
              MR. KNAPP: But our undue burden is -- and this is in
20
    Exhibit O on page three that we filed with the Court.
21
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
22
              MR. KNAPP: This is HUD's communication to the House
23
    Committee on Veteran's Affairs, HUD estimates that if they were
24
    to exclude -- and they don't have authority to do it.
25
              But they estimate that the impact of excluding
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- 1 disability benefits from Section 8 writ large, so that's all
- 2 low income housing vouchers, not just HUD VASH, we're talking
- 3 about \$190 million impact and a decrease of the number of
- 4 vouchers that are available by 25,000. That's a substantial
- 5 burden.
- 6 Again, I -- this is a problem that VA and HUD are
- 7 aware of, that they are invested in solving.
- 8 You know, when we get to trial, Your Honor, you're
- 9 going to hear from people who in good faith spend every day
- 10 | working on behalf of --
- 11 **THE COURT:** Yeah.
- 12 MR. KNAPP: -- veterans who are passionate about
- 13 this, who want to get people the services that they're entitled
- 14 to.
- But they can't wish cast the way I've heard
- 16 | Plaintiffs' counsel do today. They have a limited set of
- 17 | authorities and a limited pot of money, and they can't rob
- 18 Peter to pay Paul.
- 19 If Your Honor has any questions, I'm happy to
- 20 entertain them but --
- 21 **THE COURT:** I just have one for both of you in a
- 22 moment.
- 23 MR. SPEAKER: Nothing from me, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: Counsel?
- 25 MR. SPEAKER: Nothing, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Would you go up to the lectern? Would you go up to the lectern? Either one, just pick one of you. This probably has nothing to do with your lawsuit, but it might. Go join each other. It's a wonderful picture having you two together, okay? It's visual. All right. So far I've heard words like "they," "the system works, " "raiding piggybank, " etcetera. And I'm having trouble with "they." In other words, I'm having trouble with who I'm dealing with. I initially had that trouble in the papers between the VA and the HUD when some finger-pointing crossed, which I don't think that's going to be your position eventually. When a veteran joints the military and takes an oath, that's to the United States. It's not to the State of California, by the way, it's not to Arkansas or Alabama. It's to the United States of America. And yet when we come to veterans' benefits, I don't understand the system, and maybe I don't need to, where housing at least is going to be financed through tax incentives that drive me out to the marketplace, which creates bureaucracy and absolutely slows this process. Who -- now I'm using "they" -- concocted this system?

literally say to the developer, you develop it, this is "X"

Why isn't this directly funded through HUD or the VA where they

we're creating a process that is inevitably flawed.

- amount of profit, we control it? Because housing it would seem
 would be constructed so much faster in that process.

 And every time we drive it now out to the developer
 that goes to some funding stream on a county or city basis,
- 6 Who made this system up?
 - Congress. And it's in the <u>West Los Angeles Leasing Act</u>. The way that Congress envisioned projects being developed on the campus in the West Los Angeles --

MR. KNAPP: Your Honor, I would submit that it's

11 **THE COURT:** Okay.

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- 12 MR. KNAPP: -- <u>Leasing Act</u> was through third party
 13 enhanced use leases.
 - THE COURT: Okay. So you don't have the power -- and I'm not saying that I'm right. Leave the professional driving to the people who are professionals. I'm not the professional yet.
- So you don't have the ability to change that system

 even if there was a better system.
- 20 MR. KNAPP: No, Your Honor.
- 21 THE COURT: You're stuck with local, state tax
 22 incentives. Folks, I can't imagine how you could slow the
 23 process anymore.
- MR. ROSENBAUM: And I can't --
- 25 **THE COURT:** But, frankly, and this has nothing to do

- 1 with this motion, but maybe before or after the lawsuit you 2 could go talk to somebody in Congress. And here's why. Look, United States military hopefully doesn't 3 outsource itself because they should be responsible to central 4 5 Now I know Erik Prince ran around with Blackwater, 6 etcetera. I get that. 7 But -- and veterans are really told that they're going to do the difficult immediately, and the impossible will 8 take just a little bit longer. So they're used to that kind of 10 reaction of immediacy. 11 I can understand a system after World War Two where 12 five million or six million combatants came back and the United 13 States couldn't support that kind of system. 14
 - In fact, Congress was very generous. They created the GI Bill, did a lot of good things out there, Congress, the VA, everybody.

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But by the same token, now we're moving to a professional military. If you haven't looked, it's like the Marine Corp. It's all voluntary in every service.

Well, if you're going to lose to -- move to a professional military, there may be the argument eventually that there's a greater burden on Congress to support that one percent or two percent volunteering because you're able to avoid the draft.

And if you're consciously going to be able to avoid

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handicapped in a sense.

150 the draft in this country, then there may be a greater duty to veterans, that one or two or three percent who are going to serve, to take care of them on the backside. So let's all recognize if we went to a draft, I don't know that the country could support five or six million, you know, returning combatants. Don't know we have that kind of money. But do we -- question I've got in the future for both of you who have access to government apparently, because they're not going to listen to some federal judge, there has to be a way for Congress to recognize that there has to be maybe a greater duty or at least shortening this process when we deal with veterans' benefits if we're going to move to an all voluntary force. So that's what we've done. Okay. MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, may I respond? No, not -- I'm on a roll right now, okay? THE COURT: MR. ROSENBAUM: Oh, I'm sorry. That has nothing to do, I know, THE COURT: Yeah. with facially discrimination. I get it. So I don't think we have the power, and I don't know that that's even a better system. But I do know this. you're depending upon tax incentives, this process is going to

22 23 be innately slow. 24 And therefore you're not bad people.

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So when we get into finger-pointing about who's the
bad entity here, I think we're all in it for the same reason.
We want to enhance veterans' benefits, okay?
          And as soon as we get into the finger-pointing of
who's the bad entity, I think it slows that process.
          I really wish we had a senator got a transcript of
this or somebody who had some power in Congress to really take
legislatively what you're arguing on behalf of the Plaintiff.
          But I don't know where this is going to lead us in
litigation. I've got a lot of thinking to do.
          Now, I'm going to --
          MR. ROSENBAUM: Could I just respond briefly --
          THE COURT: -- give you one last shot -- no, I'm
going to give you all the time you want.
          MR. ROSENBAUM:
                         Okay.
          THE COURT: Be patient with me.
          MR. ROSENBAUM:
                          Okay.
                     When I was litigating, I got to the
          THE COURT:
elevator and I said, if I just would have told that stupid
judge one more thing he or she would have understood what I
said and would have found my way.
          Okay. You're at the elevator. What else do you want
to say? What's going to persuade me? And --
          MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't think --
                      -- then your turn on the VA side.
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152 1 MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't think that's the introduction 2 that I was looking for, Your Honor. 3 (Laughter) No, Al (phonetic) said that stupid judge, 4 THE COURT: 5 don't worry, that was under my breath, okay? The -- my point is this, Your Honor. 6 MR. ROSENBAUM: 7 I don't agree with counsel that Congress was not aware of the 8 points that Your Honor just made. 9 I went through the statute. You've been through the 10 statute. Counsel says again that west L-A-V-A leasing act 2016 11 mandates EULs in order to provide permanent supportive housing. 12 It does no such thing. I counted three times that 13 the word "may" is there. It doesn't say "must," doesn't say 14 "exclusive." That's how Congress could have ended up. 15 And assuming that Congress wanted to put veterans in 16 precisely the position you talked about, having to wait for --17 search out state and local entities are giving out tax credits, 18 and that's the only way it gets done, I think does a disservice 19 to Congress. 20 Congress, you said, here is one method that could be 21 channeled. But it didn't say that it was exclusive. 22 that's why I pointed to the rest of the statute. All sorts of 2.3 things that the VA does that has -- that have no --24 THE COURT: No, --

-- exclusive limitations.

MR. ROSENBAUM:

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THE COURT: -- counsel, my point, counsel, is Congress also could have had a direct contracting system with the builder. And my point was that this is once again bureaucracy slowing this process when you have to go to local and state. And that has nothing to do with your argument today. I understand that. And it's too bad we didn't have senators listening to this and Congressmen, because whatever a federal court does will probably go up on appeal, languish for a couple years, etcetera, maybe make a little bit of impact. But this truly does call for some reform at the legislative level or some look at the legislative level because I don't know how much this case changes anything. MR. ROSENBAUM: This case is going to change everything, Your Honor, because --THE COURT: Okav. MR. ROSENBAUM: -- when Your Honor rules as we expect it will based on the evidence that we will present, that Section 504 presents, provides, requires the VA as an accommodation to provide permanent supportive housing, then the ball is in the government's court. Then the government has to come up. I don't think there's anything right now, counsel certainly hasn't pointed to anything, that says that they

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    today.
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              THE COURT: Counsel, anything else? Otherwise I've
    got a lot of thinking and writing to do and maybe rewriting. I
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    need to look at this entire area again, okay? Which I'll do.
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              I was -- give me this rest of this week and give me
 6
    the weekend just because of our calendar. But we'll have
7
    something out to you, well, maybe as early as Friday. I don't
 8
    think Thursday but certainly by Monday if I need the weekend,
 9
    okay?
10
              MR. SPEAKER:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
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              MR. ROSENBAUM:
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
12
              THE COURT:
                          Thank you very much, counsel. You -- all
13
    of you have a good day.
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              And thank you for the excellent drafting. Thank you
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    for the excellent briefing. I want to pay each of you that
16
    compliment on the record. I don't think it could be better
17
    briefing. And I don't think it could be better argued.
                                                              So
18
    thank you very much. Have a good day now.
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              MR. KNAPP: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Goodbye.
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         (This proceeding was adjourned at 3:15 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

on / Julian

July 11, 2024

Signed

Dated

TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER